Hastings Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 6

Article 6

7-2011

Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 Hastings L.J. 1673 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol62/iss6/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Forced Federalism:
States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform
KEITH CUNNINGHAM-PARMETER*

Ever since Justice Louis Brandeis characterized states as laboratoriesof democracy,
judges and scholars have championed the ability of states to offer a diverse array of
solutions to complex nationalproblems. Today, proponents of enhanced immigration
restrictionsapply the same rationaleto state immigration laws. This Article challenges
the assertion that states can serve as valuable laboratoriesof immigration reform.
States that enact their own immigration laws do not internalize costs or yield replicable
results-two conditions needed for viable experimentation. When states internalize
costs, other jurisdictions can effectively evaluate outcomes. Replication occurs when
states take diverse approaches to common problems. Unfortunately, current state
immigration laws do not meet these criteria because states operate in a system of
"forcedfederalism":a division of power between the two levels of government in which
subnationaljurisdictionsattempt to force the federal government to accept state-defined
immigration enforcement schemes. But as states thrust their chosen levels of
immigration control on the federal government, their potential to innovate on
immigration matters is quite restricted. Essentially, forced federalism limits states to a
narrow set of enforcement decisions based on federally defined norms-farfrom the
type of diverse testing associated with true innovation and replication.
Today's state immigration experiments also fail to internalize costs-anothercondition
of successful subnational tests. Restrictionist states that encourage unauthorized
immigrants to resettle in other jurisdictions export the economic damage they claim
illegal immigration causes. In addition to economic spillovers, laboratorystates export
social costs to the nation by fundamentally altering the concept of a shared national
identity. Forexample, when immigrantsflee restrictioniststates in orderto avoid racial
profiling or harassment, the nationalcommitment to values such as egalitarianismand
nondiscriminationis weakened. These harms are not confined to restrictioniststates
alone but are felt by the nation as a whole.
Not all subjects are ripe for local experimentation and not all tests produce valid
results. Despite the appealing image of states as laboratories, today's immigration
experiments will not advance the nation's ongoing search for sounder immigration
policies.
* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., Stanford University. I am grateful to
Laura Appleman, Richard Birke, Caroline Davidson, and Paul Diller for sharing their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Christian Ambroson and Aaron Girata provided outstanding
research assistance throughout this project. Finally, I thank Dean Symeon Symeonides for generously
supporting this Article with research funding.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is undergoing an unprecedented upheaval. The
states, displeased with decades of lax enforcement at the federal level,

have taken immigration matters into their own hands. In response to the
widespread perception that the federal government cannot or will not

control the border, state legislatures are now furiously enacting
immigration-related laws, with stricter enforcement schemes predicted to
come.' These attempts to wrestle control of enforcement decisions from
I.

See generally NAT'L

CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2010 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS
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the federal government have cast into doubt the doctrinal core of
immigration law: federal exclusivity.
The field has not experienced such a dramatic shift in power since
the nineteenth century. During that time-the so-called "lost century" of
immigration law-states ruled supreme.' In the absence of federal
immigration laws, the states established their own criteria for excluding
and removing undesirable immigrants and enforced those criteria
through quarantines, inspection laws, and criminal codes.' In 1875, the
Supreme Court struck down a series of state enactments and ushered in a
new era of federal preeminence over immigration law that remained in
place until recently.'
A new spate of legislation at the subnational level has once again
placed the states at the center of the national immigration debate.
Various states have enacted new immigration laws that: make the
transporting of unauthorized immigrants a state felony,' require local
police to ascertain the immigration status of suspects,6 and establish a
toll-free hotline for citizens to report sightings of unauthorized
immigrants. Even when courts enjoin some of these laws, local police
continue to arrest suspects for violating federal immigration regulations.9
AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE STATES (2010)
NAT'L

CONFERENCE

OF STATE

(listing immigration-related enactments in forty-four states);

LEGISLATURES,

2oo9

STATE LAWS

RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS

AND

31, 2009 (2oo9); Michael W. Savage, 3 Other States Weighing
POST, July 8, 2oo, at A4 (considering which states will enact tougher

IMMIGRATION, JANUARY I-DECEMBER

Tough Immigration Bills, WASH.
immigration laws).

2. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833,
1833-34 (1993) (challenging the assumption that U.S. borders were uncontrolled until the late
nineteenth century).
3. Id. at 1883 (listing different categories of state immigration laws).
4. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, i8 Stat. 477 (establishing prohibitions against the immigration of
convicted criminals and prostitutes); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (striking down a
California law designed to prevent Chinese immigration); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U.S. 259,
274 (1875) (striking down a New York law regulating the importation of foreign passengers).
5. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460 (Supp.
2010); UTAH CODE § 76-10-2901 (2011); see also Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and
Citizen ProtectionAct: Blowing off Steam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 296-97, 34043 (2oo9) (summarizing recent immigration restrictions).
6. ARsz. REV. STAT. ANN. § Ii-lo5i(B) (Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003 (2011) (requiring
police officers to verify the immigration status of vehicle passengers when there is a reasonable
suspicion to believe that the vehicle contains unauthorized immigrants). But see United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, oo8 (D. Ariz. 2olo), aff'd, 641 F-3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining
portions of the Arizona law).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-30-10 (Supp. 2oo); see also Savage, supra note I, at A4 (summarizing
claims that South Carolina's immigration law was the strictest yet).
8. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at loo8 (issuing preliminary injunction against
sections of Arizona's immigration law).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F-3d II88, 1193 (ioth Cir. 2001) (allowing state
police to make arrests for civil immigration violations); Susan N. Herman, Introduction, David G.
Trager Public Policy Symposium: Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in
the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1201, 1222-25 (2004) (examining the constitutional dimensions
of state authority to make immigration arrests).
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This continued state activity ensures that the issue of immigration
federalism will remain in our legal consciousness for the foreseeable
future.'o
Ever since Justice Brandeis characterized states as laboratories of
democracy," judges and scholars have championed the ability of states to
offer a diverse array of solutions to complex national problems." Today,
proponents of enhanced immigration restrictions apply the same
rationale to state immigration laws. They describe states as policy
innovators that represent the future of immigration enforcement. 3
This Article challenges the assertion that states can serve as
valuable laboratories of immigration reform. I begin by examining the
states' current position within the system of immigration federalism. 4
According to federalism scholars, states can behave like "servants" or
"sovereigns" in their interactions with the federal government."
"Sovereigns" are autonomous policymakers, while "servants" are
cooperative partners that implement federal programs." I explain how
states have played each of these roles at various points in the nation's
immigration history. But neither role accurately depicts the current
system. Today, states that enact their own immigration laws are not
federal servants because they act independently-and often over the
lo. See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) [hereinafter Motomura, Federalism] (describing

"immigration federalism" as a system that defines the role subnational actors play in making and
implementing immigration law and policy); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968,
1970 (2011) (holding that federal law does not preempt Arizona regulations requiring employers to
electronically verify the immigration status of new hires).
II. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

12. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 6o6 (1996)
(discussing the popularity of the "states are laboratories" characterization among courts and scholars);
see also Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalismand ConstitutionalRights, 152 U.
PA. L. REV. 1745,

1745-47

(2004) (examining the "experimentation model of federalism" in recent

Supreme Court opinions); infra Part II.A and accompanying discussion of the Supreme Court's
frequent description of states as policy innovators.
13. See, e.g., Emily Bazar, Strict Immigration Law Rattles Oklahoma Businesses, USA TODAY, Jan.
10, 2oo8, at At (describing Oklahoma as a laboratory in the national debate over immigration); E.J.

Montini, Still Doubting Thomas on Immigration?,ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 18, 20o, at Bi (providing an
example of the laboratory characterization); see also Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension
of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REv. 787, 847 (2oo8) (discussing the experimental value of
restrictive subnational laws); Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing Immigration
Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. io6i, 1070-71 (2oo7) (arguing in favor of local immigration
experimentation).

14. See Motomura, Federalism, supra note io, at 1361 (introducing the term "immigration

federalism" and explaining how it encompasses state attempts to make and enforce immigration law
and policy); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630

(1997) (describing the "extreme contrast in federal-state powers" involved in immigration federalism).
15. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, II8 YALE L.J. 1256,

1258 (2oo8) (explaining how these roles establish "two distinct visions of federal-state relations").
16. See id. at 1258-59 (discussing the states' ability to innovate while acting as uncooperative
servants).
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expressed objection-of the federal government. Conversely, they are
not sovereigns because their enforcement policies remain tightly
hemmed in by federally defined norms. Even though they claim to act in
harmony with congressional objectives," the United States does not seek
their help. Neither sovereigns nor servants, these states are immigration
interlopers.
Recent state immigration laws operate in a system I call "forced
federalism": a division of power between the two levels of government in
which states attempt to dictate their own immigration enforcement
schemes to the federal government. As Part I explains, the level of
immigration control a state selects within forced federalism can range
from no control in the case of sanctuary states to maximum control in the
case of restrictionist states. But as states attempt to force the federal
government to accept their chosen level of immigration control, their
potential to innovate on immigration matters remains quite limited.
Unlike true sovereigns that can set their own admissions criteria or true
servants that receive broad delegations of power to creatively implement
federal norms, the intermeddlers of forced federalism cannot do either.
Rather, the states' options under forced federalism remain restricted to a
narrow set of enforcement decisions -far from the type of diverse testing
associated with true innovation.
Having introduced in Part I a theoretical framework for evaluating
state immigration laws, I outline in Part II the requisite conditions for
successful experimentation. Drawing from the scholarship on experimental
federalism, I explain why two concepts- internalization and replicationare crucial conditions for successful state-based tests. State experiments
that internalize costs-social, economic, and political -provide useful
data on outcomes for outside policymakers to evaluate. Likewise, if
several states engage in novel experiments on the same subject, they can
produce a broad range of policy options, any one of which other states or
the federal government can choose to replicate. The latter half of Part II
explains how these principles have played prominent roles in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on immigration federalism.
Part III explains why current state immigration laws that operate
within forced federalism cannot fully internalize costs or yield replicable
results. Beginning with the restrictionist case, I concede that laboratory
states internalize some of the costs of their tests. For example, if
businesses boycott a state or if consumer prices increase because of state
restrictions, those costs are borne entirely within the state, thereby
enhancing the apparent validity of the experiment. There are, however,
other externalities that lie just beneath the surface. The acknowledged
17. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to
Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 483 (2oo8) ("[S]tates are only permitted to act in
ways that are in harmony with federal law and consistent with congressional objectives.").

1678

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:I673

purpose of restrictionist measures is to encourage the mass exodus of
unauthorized immigrants; I explain why most of these immigrants will
resettle in other states rather than return to their countries of origin. As
such, laboratory states export to their sister states the economic damage
they claim illegal immigration causes. In addition, states that enact
restrictive immigration legislation demand additional resources from the
federal government to assist with verifying the status of suspects and
prosecuting them for state-created immigration crimes. This, in turn,
produces additional externalities by requiring the federal government to
reallocate resources away from nonexperimenting states.
Beyond economic and policy spillovers, state-based experiments
give rise to serious social externalities as well. Laws enacted in
restrictionist states have already achieved their goal of motivating some
unauthorized immigrants, most of whom are Latino, to leave these states.
Likewise, so-called "sanctuary states"-states that refuse to cooperate
with federal efforts and therefore operate at the opposite end of forced
federalism -might attract citizens or legal residents who fear racial
profiling or refuse to live in a state with never-ending border patrols."
Although a variety of social and cultural factors already contribute to
this type of racial and ideological sorting, Americans continue to
maintain a shared belief in certain values such as egalitarianism,
nationalism, and tolerance for diversity." The prospect of immigrants
marching toward welcoming states while concerned citizens march in the
opposite direction threatens to weaken these fundamental precepts of a
shared national identity. By definition, states cannot internalize the
social costs of redefining the national community.
More functionally, the federal government cannot replicate the
results emerging from these experiments. As explained in Part II,
replication requires that states engage in diverse experiments that yield
an array of policy options from which state and federal legislators may
select. But this novelty requires a level of diversity and competition in
ideas that is not achievable within the current system of forced
federalism. Both sanctuary states and restrictionist states are hamstrung
in the options they can pursue. For example, they cannot issue visas
based on local labor needs or delay deportation actions based on
humanitarian concerns. Because states do not act as sovereigns, their
pursuit of reform within forced federalism is limited to a very narrow set
of decisions related to the level of cooperation they will or will not
provide on enforcement matters. Although the success or failure of these
local decisions might provide some marginal benefit to the federal
Is. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § I8I.850 (2oo9) (prohibiting state police officers from arresting
suspects for violating federal immigration laws); see also infra Part III.D and accompanying discussion
of state sanctuary policies.
19. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA 31

(989).
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government, the information that emerges from these laboratories is far
removed from the major immigration-related decisions the federal
government faces. Examples of these include whether to tighten border
security, expand the nation's guestworker program, or grant amnesty to
unauthorized immigrants.o In short, because state experiments fail to
internalize costs or yield adoptable results, they cannot help answer the
most important questions that dominate the national debate over
immigration reform. Given these structural deficiencies, the nation should
proceed cautiously before embracing this model of experimentation.

1. MOVING

TOWARD FORCED FEDERALISM

A. Two MODELS OF INNOVATION
States tend to occupy two roles within our federalist system. One
role allows them to act as sovereigns that compete with the federal
government.2 Under this model-commonly dubbed "dual federalism"states are described as isolated entities that possess their own spheres of
influence." The allocation of responsibilities between the two levels of
government is entirely static; power is either centralized through national
policies or reserved for the states." The states and federal government do
not collaborate with one another, but instead exist as competitive
coequals.24 The Supreme Court has championed this version of
federalism at times, pointing to constitutional limitations placed on
Congress's enumerated powers as evidence of the states' "inviolable
sovereignty."" According to the Court, dual federalism preserves the
states' "dignity," thereby enabling them to exercise "concurrent
authority over the people.",,6

20. See Michael J. Wishnie, Essay, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 1446-47

(2oo8) (discussing the core components of comprehensive immigration reform).
21. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 15, at 1258 (examining the extent of state powers
within dual federalism).
22. See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, 557-59 (2000)
(arguing that in practice, states typically act more like partners than like autonomous entities in a dual
federalist scheme).
23. See Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: EnvironmentalFederalism and the Need
for FederalAction on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 417-18 (2008)
(discussing competing federalism arrangements in environmental law).
24. Id. at 442-44 (summarizing the Supreme Court's defense of the sovereignty model).
25. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. IOOI, lo4-5 (1995) (describing the "autonomy model" of federalism); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,

The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 831-32 (1998) (describing the historical development of

dual federalism).
26. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20); see also Betsy

J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudenceand National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475,
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In contrast to the autonomy model, cooperative federalism
describes states less like sovereigns and more like federal servants.7 This
system takes a more pragmatic approach to the day-to-day operations of
government, explaining how state and federal powers intermingle
constantly. For example, most states spend a great deal of time
implementing and administering federal programs in order to obtain
funding or to avoid displacement in particular fields. States work with
and under the supervision of federal authorities, although the extent of
such oversight varies considerably among programs. Overall, the nature
of these interactions is integrative rather than adversarial.30
Proponents of state innovation often invoke the sovereignty model.
According to those who support decentralized control, states that act in
their sovereign capacities are more likely to enact different laws that
produce evidence about the effectiveness of separate programs.3 ' Thus,
states should maintain independent powers, especially over inherently
local matters, in order to maximize the sovereign's unique potential to
innovate.3
More recent scholarship on experimental federalism has explored
the ways in which states can exercise their creative urges even under a
system of cooperative federalism.33 As servants of the federal
government, states are constantly enforcing federal rules or developing
their own regulations based on federally established guidelines.34
Although this arrangement might appear to narrow the states' choices,
states actually maintain a wide degree of discretion in the process. For
example, by exercising delegated powers, states can express preferences
for particular enforcement strategies based on local needs and resources.

498 (2oo2) (explaining how the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence respects the states'
sovereign interests).
27. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 15, at 1258 (describing state-federal interactions within
a system of cooperative federalism).
28. See Sovacool, supra note 23, at 447-48 (summarizing the ongoing debate over the relative
merits of dual federalism and cooperative federalism).
29. See Greve, supra note 22, at 558-59 (arguing that cooperative federalism discourages policy
innovations among the states).
30. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 15, at 1262 (discussing the version of federalism that is
commonly dubbed "marble cake federalism").
31. See Althouse, supra note 12, at 1745-46 (summarizing the argument that subnational units can
produce different policies for use at the national level).
32. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Can the Government ProhibitGay Marriage?,5o S. TEX.
L. REV. 15, 32-33 (2oo8) (discussing information generated by local experimentation on marriage

issues); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, I12 HARv. L. REV. 4, 62-63
(1998) (explaining how federal law can interfere with state-based experimentation).
33. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalismto Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY
L.J. 1, 8-9 (2oo6); see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 15, at 1263-64 (examining the states'
ability to dissent within cooperative federalism).
34. See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration FederalismSeriously, 2007 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 57, 6667 (2oo7) (describing the role of cooperative federalism within immigration law).
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Likewise, in developing rules that respond to national guidelines, states
can decide whether to meet minimum federal standards or exceed such
floors. Thus, proponents of cooperative federalism assert that fifty
different servants working at the behest of the federal government are
quite likely to take nonuniform approaches to national problems and,
therefore, innovate.35
The servant model, though, does not always facilitate innovation.
For example, if Congress attaches elaborate restrictions to spending
offers, the states' room to maneuver is quite limited. As such, these
federal servants will innovate only when given broad mandates that
enable flexibility and a free exchange of information.6 The "bounded
discretion" of this approach allows states to engage in diversified, yet
constrained experimentation.37 As explained below, the states have
exercised authority within each of these systems-dual federalism and
cooperative federalism-at various points in the nation's immigration
history.

B.

SOVEREIGNS, SERVANTS, AND IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

Given broad judicial pronouncements regarding federal supremacy
over immigration matters, it might appear that states cannot act like
immigration sovereigns or servants. After all, the Supreme Court has
strictly forbidden states from determining "who should or should not be
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant
may remain."3" According to the Court, the federal government
maintains exclusive, plenary authority over these questions of "pure"
immigration law. In fact, the federal government's domain in the field is
so extensive that the Court has stated that "over no conceivable subject
is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens." 39
But states were not always immigration bystanders. In the past, the
states did not passively defer to federal commands, but were actively
involved in decisions related to admissions and exclusions. More
recently, some states have begun to behave like federal servants that
work cooperatively with the federal government on immigration
enforcement. These developments not only explain the states' changing
roles within immigration federalism, they form the historical foundation
for today's system of forced federalism.

35. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 33, at 8-9 (arguing that interactive federalism "may produce a
broader variety of potential solutions" than other systems).
36. Dorf, supra note 32, at 61-62.
37. See Caminker, supra note 25, at lo79 (challenging the conventional claim that
commandeering deters state-based innovation).
38. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
39. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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i. Immigration Sovereigns
Long before the federal government became involved in
immigration enforcement, the states acted as immigration sovereigns. In
his groundbreaking research on early immigration laws, Gerald Neuman
convincingly disproved the common claim that immigration law began
only when Congress acted in the late nineteenth century.4 o Despite these
findings, many lawyers, scholars, and judges continue to assume that the
nation's first century was marked by "unimpeded immigration" in which
huddled masses of foreigners freely crossed borders without interference
from either level of government.4 Although this account fairly accurately
describes Congress's laissez-faire approach to immigration law throughout
the nation's early history, the states assumed a much more active role
during this period.4 2
Throughout the nation's first century, states enacted their own
immigration laws, criminal codes, and public health restrictions to
prevent undesirable immigrants from entering their jurisdictions. For
example, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and Virginia prohibited foreign criminals from becoming
state residents.43 Other states demanded security payments from shippers
that transported foreign nationals." In addition, some states attempted to
remove undesirable immigrants by offering them conditional pardons or
simply returning them "to the place or country from which they came."45
The federal government did very little to displace these early state
immigration laws. For example, while some states prohibited foreign
criminals from entering their borders as early as 1787, Congress did not
enact a similar ban until 1875.46 Likewise, although the federal
40. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 1834 (explaining how states regulated transborder movements
during the nineteenth century).
41. Id. at 1834-35.
42. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW I1-20 (1996) (surveying early immigration laws at the state level).
43. Neuman, supra note 2, at 1842 (noting that states enforced these provisions by penalizing
persons responsible for transporting convicts, rather than the convicts themselves); see also Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1557, 1568-69 (20-8) (explaining how these measures were utilized to prevent the entry of undesirable
outsiders).
44. Neuman, supra note 2, at 1842-49 (discussing various state attempts to charge transporters of
immigrants).
45. Id. at 1845-52 (arguing that these removal proceedings helped appease growing nativist
sentiments during the mid-nineteenth century); see also Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption:
Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 221-22 (1994)
(discussing the deference afforded to the states in establishing entry requirements); Kunal M. Parker,
State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts,
19 LAW & HisT. REV. 583, 638-39 (2ool) (discussing early efforts in Massachusetts to deport indigent
immigrants).
46. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (restricting the immigration of convicted criminals
and prostitutes); see Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS
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government began deporting immigrants for crimes of moral turpitude in
1917, the states had been banishing convicted criminals since the 17oos.47
These early divisions of power resembled in many ways a system of
dual federalism. With the federal government uninterested or unwilling
to enact legislation that comprehensively regulated immigration matters,
the states assumed control by utilizing their reserved police powers." As
predicted by proponents of dual federalism, this autonomy produced a
variety of nonuniform control measures. For example, some states
attempted to exclude nearly every type of criminal immigrant, while
others took a more limited approach by excluding only certain
immigrants convicted of specific crimes.49 Likewise, some states focused
their enforcement efforts on the immigrants themselves, whereas others
attempted to penalize third parties who transported immigrants across
borders.o Thus, the sovereignty model allowed each state to decide
whom to admit and the means to achieve locally defined admissions
criteria.'
The Supreme Court ended these early immigration experiments in
the late nineteenth century when it announced that the federal
government maintained broad, exclusive immigration powers." After a
series of decisions expanding the federal government's province over
immigration matters, the states morphed from sovereigns to bystanders.53
This division of power remained intact for over a century. Throughout
L.Q. 939, 953 (1995) (explaining how Congress failed to enact immigration legislation during
the early nineteenth century); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1842 (summarizing a Georgia law that
prohibited the entry of felons banished from other states or countries).
47. Neuman, supra note 2, at 1844-45 (noting that many states eventually prohibited banishment
as a formal matter); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, II3 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1908-o9 (2ooo) (discussing
the history of banishment in the colonies); Stumpf, supra note 43, at 1577 (examining the federal
government's approach to removal during the nineteenth century).
48. See Huntington, supra note 13, at 819-20 (asserting that Congress enacted immigration
legislation not because of a perceived constitutional mandate, but because of ongoing social and
political changes in the United States); see also Spiro, supra note 14, at 1628 (describing the "federal
legislative vacuum" during the nineteenth century that enabled states to regulate immigration
matters).
49. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 1842 (comparing Connecticut's more limited ban to those in
other states).
50. Id. at 1883-84 (discussing several categories of state immigrations laws).
51. Manheim, supra note 46, at 956 ("[The states] purported to determine for themselves which
aliens were suitable for admission and which were not.. .. ").
52. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U.S. 259,
274 (1875); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 Lov. U. CHi. L.J. i,
14 n.82 (20o7) (discussing the shift in immigration power that occurred during the late nineteenth
century).
53. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889); see also Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, lo6 MICH. L. REv. 567, 612-13 (2oo8) (explaining how the notion of federal exclusivity
took hold during the late nineteenth century).
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the twentieth century, the federal government acted as a self-declared
immigration sovereign.54 Although some states passed laws during this
period that attempted to alter certain immigration-related incentives,"
very few states enacted legislation designed to enforce federal
immigration standards directly.'
Despite the dramatic shift of power from the states to the federal
government during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, dual
federalism's preeminence in the field continued." Just as the nineteenth
century was marked by de facto state control over immigration law, the
twentieth century was marked by federal exclusivity in the same area.
Although the roles occupied by the two levels of government changed,
the basic federalist structure remained the same. Whether it was state
control during the nation's first century or federal control more recently,
both eras in immigration law contained the hallmarks of dual federalism:
separately reserved spheres of influence with minimal overlap of
authority between the two levels of government.
Immigration Servants
Dual federalism's hold on immigration enforcement began to loosen
at the end of the twentieth century. In 1996, Congress amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to authorize the federal
government to enter into agreements with state and local law
enforcement agencies to investigate, apprehend, and detain residents for
suspected immigration violations." Although this change did not alter
the federal government's exclusive control over admissions decisions, it
enabled subnational law enforcement units to exercise delegated
enforcement powers. Pursuant to these delegations, local police officers
2.

54. See Huntington,supra note 13, at 820 (arguing that the Constitution does not mandate federal
exclusivity over all immigration matters).
55. See Manheim, supra note 46, at 954-55 (discussing state-based alienage discrimination in
employment and public benefits); Rodriguez, supra note 53, at 569-70 (discussing the states'
"occasional" activity in these areas during the twentieth century). California's Proposition 187, which
prohibited unauthorized immigrants from obtaining nearly all state services, marked the most
prominent subnational immigration-related law prior to the current period. See Motomura,
Federalism, supra note lo, at 1365-67 (summarizing the law and arguing that it reflected a renewed
state interest in controlling illegal immigration); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 126r (C.D. Cal. 1997) (enjoining the enforcement of various provisions of
the law); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(same).
56. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police,
91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2oo6) (explaining how the Supreme Court prevented states from engaging
in immigration lawmaking during the twentieth century).
57. See Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration
Regulation, 1o OR. REV. INT'L L. 453, 488 (2oo8) (explaining how "the balance of power shifted into
federal hands" during the late nineteenth century).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(I) (2oo6).
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functioned as immigration agents who could take custody of immigrants
and gather evidence against them for prosecution or removal.59
No state accepted Congress's invitation to engage in this form of
cooperative enforcement until 2002 when Florida signed an agreement
with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").6 Since then,
the states' interest in cooperative federalism has increased substantially.
Currently, ICE works with seventy-one law enforcement agencies in
twenty-five states and has deputized over one thousand state and local
officials as immigration agents. ICE argues that the growing popularity
of these arrangements shows how "a shared approach to immigration
enforcement can benefit [local] communities."6 3
These state-federal immigration agreements might seem like perfect
opportunities for states to innovate within a system of cooperative
federalism. In theory, states working under an agreement with ICE
should be able to serve federally defined goals while developing unique
enforcement techniques based on local expertise." But only certain
models of cooperative federalism foster this type of state-based
innovation. As noted above, states will offer creative solutions to
national problems within a system of cooperative federalism only when
they receive broadly delegated powers that allow them to exercise a high
level of discretion.
Yet a number of restrictions in the INA ensure that state officials
will behave more like cloned federal agents than creative implementers.
For example, the INA requires that state police officers receive and
adhere to federal training on immigration enforcement while carrying
out their functions as deputized immigration agents." In addition, federal
59. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 196 (2oo6) (arguing that the power delegated
to local police through cooperative agreements is broader than their inherent authority to conduct
immigration arrests).
6o. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution,31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970-71 (2004)
(summarizing the cooperative agreement between Florida and the Department of Justice).
61. See Stumpf, supra note 43, at 1594-95 (explaining how concurrent enforcement efforts
accelerated after September iI, 2oo).
62. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last
visited July 4, 2011).
63. 26 Law Enforcement Officers Trained by ICE to Enforce Immigration Law, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CusToMs ENFORCEMENT (July 23, 201o), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/oo7/Ioo723charleston.htm.

Act, U.S.

64. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,91 IOwA L. REV. 243, 250
(2005) (discussing the "state-federal partnerships" of cooperative federalism).
65. See supra Part L.A and accompanying discussion of the conditions necessary to stimulate
innovation within a system of cooperative federalism.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2) (2oo6); see also Yule Kim, The Limits of State and Local Immigration
Enforcement and Regulation, 3 ALB. Gov'T L. REV. 242, 251-52 (200) (discussing the limited
enforcement discretion given to localities under cooperative federalism); McKanders, supra note 52, at
42-44 (same).
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officials must supervise and direct state officers in order to ensure
compliance with federal norms.' But the closer that states adhere to
federal policy, the less likely they are to venture in innovative directions.6
This is not to say that granting local officials unfettered discretion in
enforcing immigration regulations is any more desirable. In fact, the
limited evidence available suggests that even when hemmed in by federal
restrictions, some local officers have engaged in racial profiling and
failed to carry out the stated federal goal of arresting criminal
immigrants.69 The point is that the recent shift toward cooperative
federalism on enforcement matters cannot facilitate the kind of
unencumbered decisionmaking that proponents of delegated powers
describe. Rather, the constrained nature of the states' enforcement
authority severely limits the innovative potential of these shared statefederal enforcement efforts."o
3. Experiments in Forced Federalism
As they did in the early nineteenth century, states and localities
have once again injected themselves into immigration control measures
without seeking the federal government's permission." In contrast to
states that enter into cooperative agreements with ICE, many state
legislatures today do not seek federal approval before engaging in their
own brands of immigration enforcement. Curiously, proponents of state
immigration laws draw from very different theories of federalism to
describe the recent turn of events. In touting the virtues of state
immigration laws, they mix claims of autonomy with claims of
collaboration, thereby making confusing and often contradictory
assertions of power that contain elements of dual federalism's reserved
powers and cooperative federalism's delegated powers. According to one
account, state officers engaged in aggressive immigration enforcement
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2oo6); see also Kobach, supra note 59, at 197-99 (summarizing the
training and supervision federal officials provide to law enforcement officers).
68. Kim, supra note 66, at 254 (describing the limited role federal law contemplates for the states
in immigration enforcement).
69. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G)

AGREEMENTS 23-24 (2010) (discussing allegations of civil rights violations against local agencies
involved in cooperative enforcement); NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CrR., MORE QUESTIONS THAN
ANSWERS ABOUT THE SECURE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM 4-5 (2oo9) [hereinafter NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW

CTR.,

SECURE COMMUNmEs] (discussing problems with enforcement decisions undertaken pursuant to

cooperative immigration agreements); NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW 0M., UTAH: GOING DOWN ARIZONA'S
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PATH I (2011) (arguing that Utah's recent immigration law "promote[s] racial

profiling for law enforcement in a wide variety of scenarios").
70. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 117-18 (2oo8) (describing the states' limited role in exercising
delegated immigration authority).
71. Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1633-64
(2oo8) (comparing early local immigration laws to today's attempts to directly enforce federal
immigration law).

July 2on1]

FORCED FEDERALISM

1687

are simply exercising their inherent police authority to control crime and
protect the public. In short, they are archetypal sovereigns that possess
autonomous powers reserved for them by the Tenth Amendment. In
other instances, however, proponents of local control describe states as
federal assistants that do nothing more than enforce the laws already on
the books." Their "cooperative enforcement" of immigration norms
assists the federal government in achieving the shared goal of combating
illegal immigration."4 According to this alternate account, states are
merely helpful servants that operate within a system of cooperative
federalism.
Unfortunately, neither portrayal accurately describes the new
divisions of power created by today's state immigration laws. Local
efforts to enforce immigration laws do not reflect a dual federalist model
because laboratory states are not allowed to act like sovereigns on
immigration matters. In fact, the opposite is true: The Supreme Court
has clearly placed immigration authority within the federal government's
exclusive domain. 6 Thus, even as restrictionist states depict themselves
as pure immigration sovereigns, they rely heavily on federal immigration
laws to define state-proscribed conduct-far from the type of
unencumbered power that genuinely independent subnational actors
exercise within dual federalism." The model of cooperative federalism is
also inapposite. Although states may claim to behave like federal
servants, the assistance they offer does not derive from delegated
powers-the hallmark of cooperative federalism.'5 Instead, states have
72. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks on the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ag/speeches/2002/o6o5o2agpreparedremarks.htm (arguing that states have the inherent
authority to conduct arrests for civil and criminal immigration violations); Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and
Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 13 (Apr. 3, 2002),
available at http:// www.aclu.orgfFilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf ("States have inherent power, subject to
federal preemption, to make arrests for violation of federal law."); see also Kobach, supra note 59, at
199-2i9 ("The source of this authority flows from the states' status as sovereign governments
possessing all residual powers not abridged or superseded by the U.S. Constitution.").
73. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988-89 (D. Ariz. 20oo), affd, 641 F.3d
339 (9th Cir. 201) (noting that Arizona claimed to possess a "compelling interest in the cooperative
enforcement of federal immigration laws") (internal citations omitted); see also Kobach, supra note 59,
at 2o8-o9 (discussing the "concurrent enforcement" of federal immigration regulations).
74. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 988-89.
75. Id.; see also John Schwartz & Randal C. Archibold, A Law Facing a Tough Road Through the
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 20oo, at A17 (summarizing Kris Kobach's contention that Arizona's
immigration law provides an example of "perfect concurrent enforcement" with federal law).
76. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) ("The States enjoy no power with respect to
the classification of aliens. . . .") (internal citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § II-1o5(E) (Supp. 20o) (relying on federal immigration
determinations to enforce state law).
78. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note I, at 1266 ("Because the master delegates
responsibility, the servant has discretion in choosing how to accomplish its tasks and which tasks to
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reached into a murky regulatory zone that lies somewhere between
immigration law and police authority to assert control over immigration
enforcement."
Recent state immigration laws have created a system I call "forced
federalism." As with other theories of federalism, forced federalism
describes allocations of power between the two levels of government.
According to this theory, the states are neither servants nor sovereigns
but instead immigration intermeddlers. In contrast to dual federalism,
which involves reserved powers, and cooperative federalism, which
involves delegated powers, forced federalism involves demanded powers.
The states now insist on having a seat at the table on immigration
enforcement decisions, even though the federal government has not
invited them.
The uncertain powers that states possess under forced federalism
differ from the clearer lines of authority that other models of federalism
demarcate. Under existing theories, power is either allocated to one level
entirely or exercised concurrently. In contrast, the zone of authority
states command within forced federalism is more dynamic and less
defined. As such, the source and scope of the states' authority within
forced federalism constantly expands and contracts as courts produce
differing pronouncements on the permissibility of the states'
immigration-related conduct. Clearer divisions may eventually come to
the field. For example, Congress might explicitly authorize the states to
engage in parallel enforcement or the Supreme Court may broadly oust
them from the field. With either occurrence, more recognizable systems
of federalism will emerge, thereby providing states with a less ambiguous
regulatory space in which to operate.
Several recent subnational immigration laws demonstrate forced
federalism in action. Many states now require police officers to verify the
immigration status of suspects or detainees.8' For example, Arizona
requires police officers to determine the immigration status of any
individual stopped, detained, or arrested where there is reasonable
suspicion to believe that the person is an unauthorized immigrant. 'Law
enforcement officers in Utah must verify the immigration status of
vehicle occupants when there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the

prioritize.").
79. See Aoki et al., supra note 57, at 490 (discussing the tension between the states' police power
and the federal government's plenary power over immigration law).
8o. See Rodriguez, supra note 53, at 591-92 (summarizing direct enforcement actions in Georgia,
Oklahoma, Colorado, and Arizona); see also Huntington,supra note 13, at 799-804 (discussing various
categories of state immigration laws).
81. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1I-1o51(A) (Supp. 2oo). But see United States v. Arizona, 703 F.
Supp. 2d 980, ioo8 (D. Ariz. 20o), aff'd, 641 F. 3 d 339 (9th Cir. 2o1) (enjoining portions of the
Arizona law).
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vehicle is transporting unauthorized immigrants."' Police in North
Carolina and Georgia must verify the immigration status of any person
detained for committing a felony." Missouri broadly requires status
checks of all persons confined to jail."4 At the city and county level, local
officials have ordered police officers and sheriffs to identify and arrest
individuals for immigration violations.8 5
Other states have amended their penal codes to criminalize
immigration-related conduct. For example, Georgia, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Utah have made transporting unauthorized immigrants a
state felony. 6 Arizona recently criminalized the failure to carry an alien
registration card." Some states and localities regulate illegal immigration
in more indirect ways. For example, localities in California, Florida,
Georgia, Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Texas have enacted ordinances
that prohibit landlords from housing unauthorized immigrants." Many
states require private employers to electronically verify the immigration
status of new employees or penalize businesses that hire unauthorized
UTAH CODE § 76-9-1003 (2011).
83. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-14 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-62(a) (West Supp. 2010); see
also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural
Cohesion, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1444-45 (2009) (discussing recent subnational attempts to deter
illegal immigration); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-5-100(b) (2ol) (authorizing police officers to verify the
immigration status of any criminal suspect that fails to provide proof of legal residency).
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.680 (2010); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 171.2 (West Supp. 2011)
(requiring police to check the immigration status of all people confined to jail for driving under the
influence).
85. See Pham, supra note 6o, at 970 (explaining the origins of local restrictionist policies); see also
Stumpf, supra note 43, at 1598 (discussing local attempts to exercise nondelegated immigration
powers).
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-200 (2011) (creating a state felony for transporting eight or more
unauthorized immigrants); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 446 (West Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9460 (Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE § 76-10-2901 (2011) (creating a third-degree felony for encouraging or
inducing any immigrant to enter or reside in the state illegally); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128
(201)
(creating a state felony for transporting eight or more unauthorized immigrants); Huntington,
supra note 13, at 803 (discussing states that have amended their penal codes to create immigrationrelated crimes); McCormick, supra note 5, at 341-42 (criticizing Oklahoma's immigration law).
87. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2olo); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980,
998-ooo (D. Ariz. 2010), affd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (enjoining provision).
88. See CRISTINA RODRfGUEZ & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, TESTING THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION MEASURES 23 (2007) (discussing local
housing regulations related to unauthorized immigrants and noting that California later banned such
housing prohibitions); Huntington, supra note 13, at 802-o3 (discussing housing ordinances designed
to deter illegal immigration); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionalityof State and Local Laws
Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 588-89 (2009) (summarizing a housing
restriction in Jupiter, Florida); Stumpf, supra note 43, at 1598-99 (discussing state and local laws that
parallel "federal crimmigration laws"); Su, supra note 71, at 1643 (summarizing ordinances in
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, related to housing and employment). Courts have rejected these ordinances.
See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 62o F.3d 170, 222-23 ( 3 d Cir. 2010) (enjoining an ordinance that
penalized landlords who leased property to unauthorized immigrants); Villas at Parkside Partners v.
City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (same); Garrett v. City of
Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047 (S.D. Cal. 2oo6) (same).
82.

1690o

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:I673

immigrations." Even though courts have struck down a large number of
the foregoing provisions, state legislation in this area continues
unabated.'
The federal government has rejected many of these state-defined
levels of immigration control. For example, President Barack Obama's
Justice Department clearly signaled its displeasure with forced
federalism when it sued Arizona for enacting legislation that required
local police to ascertain the immigration status of suspects." Other
administrations, which at times have encouraged local cooperation,9 2
have expressed displeasure with forced federalism as well. For example,
President George W. Bush's Justice Department sued Illinois for
enacting legislation that prohibited businesses from using an online
system to verify the immigration status of new employees.' As with
Arizona, this litigation resulted in an injunction that halted the state's
immigration experiment.94 Although Arizona and Illinois operated at
different ends of forced federalism, each state sought to define its own
level of immigration cooperation without first seeking federal
permission. Illinois refused to participate in the federal government's
online verification program, and Arizona foisted unwanted help on the
federal government. In each case, the Justice Department opposed states
that attempted to declare the amount of assistance they would offer on
enforcement matters.

89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (Supp. 2oo) (requiring private employers to use the
federal electronic verification system to confirm the immigration status of new hires); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 71-11-3 (2011) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-20 (Supp. 2010) (same); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§36-60-6 (201i) (requiring employers with ten or more employees to electronically verify the
immigration status of new hires); UTAH CODE § 13-47-201 (2011) (requiring private employers with
fifteen or more employees to electronically verify the immigration status of new employees); Stephen
Yale-Loehr & Ted Chiaparri, Immigration: Cities and States Rush in Where Congress Fearsto Tread, in
12 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 341, 341 (2oo7) (summarizing subnational employment immigration laws);
see also Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Arizona's Improper
Legislation in the Field of "Immigration-RelatedEmployment Practices,"84 WASH. L. REV. 289, 289-92
(2oo9) (critically evaluating state attempts to utilize licensure laws to penalize employers that hire

unauthorized immigrants).
90. For example, soon after a federal court enjoined Arizona's immigration law in United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at loo8, Alabama, Georgia, and Utah passed restrictionist legislation that
contained many components of Arizona's law. Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, 2011
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, H.B. 87, 2011-12 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, H.B. 497, 20l Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2011).
91. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1007-o8.
92. See Jill Keblawi, Comment, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or
Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 8I7, 817-18 (2oo4) (explaining how the Department of
Justice's position on inherent authority changed with administrations); see also Pham, supra note 60, at
974-75 (discussing claims of inherent authority).
93. See United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703, at *1-2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12,2009).
94. Id. at *2 (holding that the Illinois law frustrated congressional purposes).
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Because courts have failed to explain clearly the propriety of these
assertions of power, the states' ability to assert their chosen levels of
immigration cooperation remains unknown. Consider the issue of
whether local police officers can arrest suspects for committing civil
immigration violations. The Tenth Circuit has held that federal law
provides a "clear invitation" for police to make such arrests,95 while the
Ninth Circuit has found "no opportunity for state activity" in this area.9
Until recently, a similar circuit split existed on the issue of state
requirements involving electronic employment verification. The Tenth
Circuit held that an Oklahoma law requiring businesses to electronically
verify the immigration status of new employees violated the Supremacy
Clause by interfering with congressional design,' whereas the Ninth
Circuit found that a nearly identical Arizona law was not preempted.
The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, holding that Arizona's law was "entirely consistent" with federal
objectives." Although the Whiting Court brought some clarity to the field
by allowing states to employ their own immigration verification systems,
many other state enforcement powers remain shrouded in forced
federalism's ambiguity. For example, in addition to judicial
disagreements over whether local police officers can arrest suspects for
noncriminal federal immigration violations, courts have issued
inconsistent rulings on whether states and localities can punish people
who "harbor" or "transport" unauthorized immigrants." In short, the
courts' preemption rulings have resulted in a disorderly jumble that
continues to obscure forced federalism's boundaries.o
In the midst of this confusion, states continue to formulate new
immigration regulations. But the fact that these assertions of power are
made within a system of forced federalism severely limits the potential for
95. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F-3 d 1294, 1300 (ioth Cir. 1999).

96. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468,474-75 (9th Cir. 1983).
97. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F-3d 742, 766-7o (1oth Cir. 2010) (discussing
congressional intent in establishing a voluntary system of electronic verification).
98. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2009), aff'd,
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011).
99. 131 S. Ct. at 1985; see also infra Part II.C.3 and accompanying analysis of Whiting.
too. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 62o F.3d 170, 222-23 (3d Cir. 200) (enjoining a city's

"anti-harboring" ordinance penalizing landlords who leased property to unauthorized immigrants),
and Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1o47 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (same), with United
States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002-04 (D. Ariz. 2010) (declining to enjoin the section of an
Arizona law prohibiting individuals from transporting, concealing, or harboring unauthorized
immigrants). Although these state criminal laws differ in many respects, each implicates existing
federal prohibitions involving related conduct. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(I)(A) (2006); Ben Meade,
Comment, Interstate Instability: Why Colorado's Alien Smuggling Statute Is Preempted by Federal
Immigration Laws, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 237, 278-79 (2008) (discussing similarities between Hazleton,
Pennsylvania's anti-harboring ordinance and Colorado's anti-smuggling law).
tot. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 354
(2oo8) (discussing judicial disagreement over immigration preemption).
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meaningful immigration experimentation." 2 Although states operating
within forced federalism oscillate between claims of autonomy and
dependence, the actual space between these two poles is quite small. For
example, states are clearly prohibited from setting their own criteria for
immigrant admissions. 3 Likewise, they cannot exclude or remove
immigrants from their territory as they did when they acted as
immigration sovereigns during the nineteenth century." Given the
federal government's exclusive authority over pure immigration law,
states are left with a small menu of enforcement options. Essentially,
they can attempt to define the level of control they will exercise (or
refuse to exercise) in enforcing federally defined norms. But none of
these decisions will result in the rich array of solutions and data offered
by other theories of federalism.
The foregoing discussion explains why forced federalism limits the
subjects of permissible state experimentation. But it does not explain
how these experiments might proceed, assuming states operate within
the small experimental zone that forced federalism reserves for them.
Thus, even if states engage in a limited number of enforcement-based
experiments, could those tests produce valuable data for the rest of the
nation? Do immigration experiments export costs to sister states and the
federal government? The following Part considers these questions.

II. THE CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVE EXPERIMENTATION
Arguments in favor of decentralized government often tout the
virtues of experimental federalism without examining the requirements
for effective state-based testing. Any analysis of the conditions necessary
for successful experimentation begins with Justice Brandeis's famous
description of states as laboratories. He wrote, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."0 o According to
Justice Brandeis, our federalist system should encourage those
experiments that produce unique and varied outcomes ("novel") without
generating negative externalities that harm the rest of the nation
("without risk").' 6 The terms "internalization" and "replication" capture
each of these concepts. Experiments that fail to internalize their costs
102. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 3I2 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) ("Any concurrent state power that may exist
is restricted to the narrowest of limits .... ).
103. See Spiro, supra note 14, at 1636 (acknowledging the "complete disparity between state and
federal power" on pure immigration decisions).
104. Neuman, supra note 2, at 1841 (discussing how states engaged in immigration regulation prior
to 1875).
105 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
so6. See id.
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generate risk because they force other states and the federal government
to pay for tests they do not control and cannot effectively evaluate.
Conversely, the nation benefits from states that pay for their own
experiments while producing replicable results. Such outcomes are more
likely to occur if each state approaches the same problem from different
vantages. Novel experiments occurring simultaneously in many different
jurisdictions yield useful data on the success and failure of each
approach. Observers can then discard the failed experiments and
replicate the successes.
This Part explains why the concepts of internalization and
replication are crucial factors for identifying high-value experiments.
Drawing from federalism scholarship and the Supreme Court's
federalism jurisprudence, it explains why states that externalize the
negative consequences of their policies will tend to overproduce
inefficient regulations, while failing to offer replicable solutions to
national problems. The Supreme Court considered these factors in three
of its most important decisions involving state immigration experiments.
In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania law that
externalized harm to immigrants by forcing them to carry state-issued
alien registration cards." In De Canas v. Bica, the Court allowed
California to enact an employment verification requirement that was
relatively novel at the time and, therefore, had the potential for
replication.'" Most recently, the Court upheld Arizona's new
immigration verification law in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,
holding that Arizona's parallel system of immigration enforcement did
not export costs to legal residents or the nation.'" The concepts of
internalization and replication not only animate these decisions, they
establish normative criteria for determining when states should be
allowed to experiment.
A.

INTERNALIZING COSTS

The concept of internalization begins with the rather uncontroversial
proposition that states should pay for the experiments they undertake.
The primary justification for this claim, of course, is that it would be
unfair to force one state to absorb the costs of another state's tests.
Beyond basic notions of equity, however, a more practical rationale is at
play: States that internalize costs shed light on the validity of their
experiments. Without knowing the real price of a particular test, the
results of the experiment provide little information for future use. Thus,
07. 312 U.S. at 56.

io8. 424 U.S. 351, 36o-62, 365 (1976) (noting that unlike in

Hines, which involved an extensive
federal regulatory scheme that conflicted with Pennsylvania's law, federal law at the time had
expressed only a "peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants").
109. 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011).
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just as meaningful scientific data derive from controlled environments,
policy experiments are most valuable when they account for cost
variables."o
Economists define externalization as a process in which actors
involved in an activity fail to realize the activity's costs or benefits,"'
thereby creating spillover problems."' Environmental regulation is
probably the most familiar example of legislative attempts to curb
negative externalities. According to the traditional account, states are
not well equipped to control environmental emissions because of their
enormous incentives to export pollution. If these states were allowed to
externalize the costs of pollution they would enjoy the economic benefits
of certain industries through jobs and taxes without incurring the
environmental and health damage associated with those activities."' On
the reverse side, the recipients of downwind pollution would not be
compensated for the negative externalities imposed on them by out-ofstate interests."' As such, federal environmental regulation seeks to
avoid a "structural failure" in which those states with lax enforcement
fail to realize the harmful effects of their experiments."' These principles
are so firmly established that even environmental scholars who generally
question the need for federal control of environmental regulations
concede that spillover problems pose a significant challenge to
decentralization." 6
Negative externalities can extend beyond economic and physical
injuries to more intangible harms. For example, the discriminatory
practices of one state may produce social and psychological harm felt by
no. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 398 n.342 (1997) (examining
the similarities between policy experimentation and medical research).
i ii. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. I030, l046 n.61 (1983); Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEo. L.J. 481, 497 (20o4).
112. 1 use the words "externality" and "spillover" interchangeably. Some economists make small
distinctions between the terms. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1355 n.5 (2oo6) (employing the same convention).
I13. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. t59, 164-65 (2oo6) (summarizing debates over environmental externalities); Robert R.
Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2373,
2375 (1996) (explaining why states have little incentive to enforce pollution controls).
114. See Pettys, supra note i ii, at 498 ("Pollutants . . . provide an equally familiar illustration of
negative externalities.").
115. See Esty, supra note 12, at 573 (considering whether localities can account for the scientific
complexities of regulated industries); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and the Environment:
Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV. I329, 1340-41 (1992) (arguing for
centralized environmental policies to combat spillover problems).
116. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2341, 2414-15 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222
(1992) ("The presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason for intervention at the federal
level...."); see also Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmics &PUB. POL'Y 53, 65 (2003) (discussing debates over environmental externalities).
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nonresidents who, though not directly affected by the discriminatory
policies, are distressed by living in a country where such practices
occur."' The reverse is true as well. States can create intangible positive
spillovers for nonresidents. For example, the knowledge that one state is
protecting endangered species or preserving certain natural wonders may
yield an "existence value" for outsiders who benefit emotionally from
these out-of-state activities."8 These intangible externalities are
notoriously difficult to measure; psychological harm cannot be easily
reduced to dollar values or other objective measures."' But even if they
do not clearly factor into economic models, such externalities can impose
significant social costs on third parties. As such, any analysis of the
extraterritorial harm caused by state experiments should at the very least
attempt to consider the role played by intangible spillovers.
Economists posit that actors are naturally drawn to behaviors that
produce negative externalities. 2 o This tendency harms both outsiders and
the cost-exporting actors who become less able to make appropriate costbenefit determinations when they externalize. 2 ' As such, a state will tend
to overprovide regulations with negative externalities, even if those
regulations fail to meet local needs."' Conversely, jurisdictions are less
likely to invest in policies that generate positive spillovers for
nonresidents."' In short, both positive and negative externalities skew
regulatory incentives, thereby resulting in welfare losses."'
The nation's federalist system is designed to prevent the spillover
problems discussed above. As Roderick Hills has stated, "The whole
point of the federal scheme is to suppress states' creativity, which might
consist only of creatively achieving benefits for their own citizens at the
117. See Pettys, supra note iiI, at 498 (examining intangible externalities).

i1s. See Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765,
768 (1999) (summarizing the argument that outsiders enjoy psychological gains from environmental
protections); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 130, 143 (2o05) ("[Tihe existence of Yellowstone National Park provides
benefits to all American citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated. . .. ").
119. See Pettys, supra note iii, at 498 (discussing the difficulty of measuring intangible
externalities).
120. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeeringand Its Alternatives:A Federalism Perspective,59 VAND. L.
REV. 1629, 1644 (2oo6); Sovacool, supra note 23, at 418-19 (arguing that states and industries are less
likely to produce positive externalities).
I2l. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in
Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 868 (2oo9) (discussing spillover problems
created by state tort actions).
122. Id. (discussing the federal government's natural ability to internalize costs); see also Bruce L.
Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 GEo. L.J. 617, 617
(1992) (explaining how cost-exporting states "make[] all worse off").
123. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1380 (2oo9) (outlining how positive externalities can
inhibit innovation).
124. See Sovacool, supra note 23, at 419 (discussing externalities and welfare losses in the context
of environmental regulation).
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expense of nonresidents."' As such, the Supreme Court's federalism
jurisprudence often focuses on identifying state experiments that
minimize extraterritorial harms. Justices have championed the virtues of
state-based innovation in a wide range of areas such as affirmative
action,I26 medical marijuana,"' DNA testing,"8 capital punishment,"'

discrimination,'o gun control,"3' and assisted suicide.' 2 Amidst these
discussions, the Supreme Court often explains why internalization is a
necessary component of successful experimentation. For example, Justice
Kennedy has closely scrutinized federal legislation that generates
spillover problems for the states."' Just as local experiments may fail to
internalize losses, Congress may improperly export costs to states and
localities. Thus, when Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
which prohibited gun possession within iooo feet of schools, Justice
Kennedy criticized the "territorial operation" of the law, which would
dramatically alter the day-to-day activities of some neighborhoods, while
barely impacting others.'34 According to Justice Kennedy, this uneven
exportation of externalities to the states undermined the "utility of our
federalism."'35
Internalization also played a key role in the Court's discussion of
medical marijuana laws in Gonzales v. Raich.36 When the Court upheld
Congress's ban on medical marijuana against a voter-approved initiative
in California, Justice O'Connor was critical of extending Congress's
Commerce Clause authority to matters involving local medical
discretion.'37 Describing innovation as "[o]ne of federalism's chief
virtues," she found no evidence that California's law substantially
interfered with economic activities outside the state."' According to
Justice O'Connor, because California internalized the social and
economic costs of its experiment, the Court should have respected this
125. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 4-5 (2oo7) (arguing that strong presumptions in favor of
preemption undermine congressional accountability).
126. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2oo3).

127. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483,502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring).

128. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2326 (2oo9) (Alito, J., concurring).
129. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322-23, 326 (2oo2) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

130. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 64o, 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 583.
135. Id. at 581-83 (discussing "considerable disagreement" between states and localities about the
best methods for deterring gun violence in schools).
136. 545 U.S. s (2oo5).
137. Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 42-43 (noting the lack of proof that medical marijuana use substantially affects
interstate commerce).
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"express choice by some States . . . to regulate medical marijuana

differently."' 39
In short, federalism scholars and the Supreme Court have
repeatedly described internalization as a necessary component of
effective state experiments. But internalization alone is insufficient to
achieve the kinds of state-to-state and state-to-federal policy transfers
described by the laboratory model. Such outcomes occur only when
experiments satisfy a second condition: replication.
B.

REPLICATING RESULTS

Even if state experiments internalize all costs, other governmental
bodies still must be able to duplicate the results of these tests. As such,
replication relates to an experiment's value beyond a laboratory state's
borders. Internalization and replication are interdependent concepts.
Experiments that internalize costs produce measurable data that third
parties can assess. But even if the results are clear, sister states still
require additional information to distinguish successful policies from
failures. Laboratory states tend to develop this data when they take
diverse approaches to shared national problems, thereby enabling
outsiders to identify and repeat effective techniques.'40 In short,
internalization ensures that state experiments yield accurate data, while
replication relates to the diversity of the data produced. 4 '
In theory, states can and ought to approach complex problems from
diverse perspectives. Because needs and preferences differ significantly
between states and regions, local approaches to shared problems should
differ as well. Thus, decentralized decisionmaking is said to bring
lawmakers "closer to the people" who will enact locally responsive
legislation.'" Although this process is lauded for enhancing political
accountability and general welfare, the more important value from the
perspective of experimentation is the production of competing policies. If
states approach common problems by matching policies to local
preferences, the nation should expect to gain knowledge from laboratory
states much more rapidly than if policies develop from a centralized
source only.'43

139. Id. at 56-57.

140. See Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism,
48 OHIo ST. L.J. 503, 507 (1987) (arguing that replication occurs when states make "comparative
measurement[s] of the consequences produced by a variety of plausible reforms").
141. See Peter S. Menell, Regulating "Spyware": The Limitations of State "Laboratories" and the
Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 2o BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1374
(2oo5) (describing the ability of state experiments to produce "independent data for assessing
alternative policies").
142. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1120, 1120

(1999) (explaining how state and local governments respond to their constituents' preferences).
143. See Dorf, supra note 32, at 6o-6i (arguing that knowledge develops rapidly through state
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The concept of replication has both horizontal and vertical
components.'" Replication occurs horizontally when sister states borrow
from, modify, and improve upon the programs of laboratory states.'45
Vertical replication occurs when the federal government adopts a state
program, or vice versa.46 The federal government has frequently engaged
in vertical replication. From health care, to education policy, to welfare
benefits, to environmental regulations, Congress modeled many of
today's federal policies after state experiments. 4 7 This approach provides
the United States with a low-risk opportunity to survey a variety of
adoptable options by isolating the harm caused by failed experiments to
laboratory states.'"

The Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the value of horizontal
and vertical replication in its federalism jurisprudence.'4 9 For example,
when the Court evaluated affirmative action policies in Grutter v.
Bollinger,it explained why state universities should be allowed to pursue
a wide range of admissions policies in order to provide information to
sister states.' The Grutter Court praised those states that prohibited
affirmative action, stating that "[u]niversities in other States can and
should draw on the most promising aspects of these race-neutral
alternatives as they develop."'' Although the Court ultimately permitted
states to carry out certain narrowly tailored, race-conscious admissions
policies, it expressed the hope that someday, horizontal replication
would derive only from race-neutral policies.'

experimentation); Sovacool, supra note 23, at 434-36 (discussing arguments in favor of decentralized
decisionmaking).
144. Caminker, supra note 25, at lo78 (examining how policies develop at both levels of
government); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 11I3, 1129 (2oo7) (discussing
the concepts of vertical and horizontal replication in the context of local experimentation).
145. See Althouse, supra note 12, at 1745-46 (arguing that state-to-state replication represents one
of the "most appealing reason[s]" for limited federal power).
146. Engel, supra note I13, at 182-83 (arguing that the laboratory metaphor applies to both types
of innovation).
147. See Kuehn, supra note I13, at 2383 (observing that a great deal of federal environmental law
is modeled after state legislation); see also Benjamin J. Beaton, Note, Walking the FederalistTightrope:
A National Policy of State Experimentationfor Health Information Technology, io8 COLUM. L. REV.
t67o, 1671 n.5 (2oo8) (discussing the role of vertical replication in the development of welfare and
education policy).
148. Perlman, supra note 140, at 507 ("The adverse consequences of misconceived solutions at the
state level are confined to that state.").
149. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 4o6 U.S. 366, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing
"the need for ... innovations that grow out of diversity"); see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas
Co., 338 U.S. 464, 488-89 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Congress may well have believed that
diversity of experimentation in the field of regulation has values which centralization and uniformity
destroy.").
150. 539 U.S. 3o6,342-43 (2oo3).
151. Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
152. Id. at 342-43.
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In the context of criminal appeals, Justice Alito recently declined to
extend a federal right to DNA testing to prisoners, citing the need for
policy innovation at the state level.' He noted that nearly every state
had already enacted its own framework for DNA testing and that the law
and science in this area were in flux. Justice Alito argued that states
should be allowed to experiment with these issues before any vertical
replication occurred."S4 This approach to replication in the context of
DNA testing mirrored Justice O'Connor's previous reluctance to
announce a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide in
Washington v. Glucksberg.' She noted that various states had
undertaken different procedures to provide terminally ill patients with
palliative care. Those local determinations involved delicate questions
such as how to define terminal illness and voluntary consent."'
According to Justice O'Connor, the Court should not interrupt states
that had undertaken "the challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding liberty interests"' because early federal
intervention might limit the potential to replicate these experiments
either horizontally or vertically., 8
C.

THE SUPREME COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS

The foregoing discussion underscores the central role that timing
plays in legal debates over policy replication. According to the Supreme
Court, states should be allowed to cultivate data on the effectiveness of
different approaches before replication occurs. If no clear solution has
emerged, the Court will be extremely reluctant to insert itself into local
policy developments. The Court has applied these same principles to
immigration experiments. In fact, the concepts of internalization and
replication helped shape the boundaries of permissible state conduct in
the Court's most important rulings on state immigration laws.
Hines v. Davidowitz: Exporting Costs to Citizens and
Immigrants
In 1939, Pennsylvania enacted legislation requiring immigrants to
register with the state each year. 5 9 The law also compelled noncitizens to
carry an alien identification card at all times and present it to police upon
i.

153. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2326 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2326-29.
155. 521 U.S. 702,737 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

156. Id. at 738.
157. Id. at 737 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Althouse, supra note 12,
at 1752 (describing Justice O'Connor's desire to refrain from "clutter[ing] experimentation with a
judicially designed solution").
158. See Bix, supra note 116, at 55 (summarizing the Supreme Court's fear that finding a right to
physician-assisted suicide would end early-stage experimentation by states).
159. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,59 (1941) (citing 35

PA. STAT.

ANN.

§§

18oi-i8o6).
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demand.'6 An immigrant's failure to do so exposed him or her to
imprisonment and fines.' 6 , One year later, Congress imposed similar
requirements on immigrants through the Alien Registration Act, which
authorized the federal government to collect and catalog the names and
fingerprints of immigrants living in the United States.'6
Bernard Davidowitz, a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, sued
the state alleging that he was "of foreign appearance and [spoke] English
with a noticeable foreign accent."'6 ' Davidowitz feared that the
Pennsylvania law would cause him embarrassment and expose him to
"constant questioning by police officers."6' After a lower court enjoined
the law,'6 , the Supreme Court reviewed its constitutionality.
In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court discussed the externalities
generated by Pennsylvania's new registration system. The Court said,
"For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national
purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one
people, one nation, one power."' 0 Citing a previous instance when the
Court had struck down a California law designed to control Chinese
immigration, the Court asked, "If [the United States] should get into a
difficulty which would lead to war, or to sus Pension of intercourse, would
California alone suffer, or all the Union?"' Just as California's law had
provoked international ire, Pennsylvania's registration system could give
rise to a similar conflict that would harm the nation as a whole. For
example, Pennsylvania's law required foreign nationals to provide the
state with their name, age, employer, and "characteristics or
appearance."' The Hines Court explained how foreign visitors might be
offended by these requirements. 69 As a subnational entity, Pennsylvania
would not pay for the harm to international relations caused by its
registration requirements.'o
Pennsylvania's law created spillover problems not only for the
federal government, but for citizens and residents as well. The Hines
Court maintained that treaty obligations prevented "injurious
discrimination in either country against the citizens of the other."' If
16o.
161.
162.
§ 452(a)

Id.
Id. at 59-6o.
Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670 § 31(a), 54 Stat. 67o (codified at 8 U.S.C.
(1946), repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414 § 4o8(a)(39), 66 Stat.

163 (1952)).
163. Davidowitz v. Hines, 30 F. Supp. 470,473 (M.D. Pa. 1939).

164. Id.
165.
66.
167.
168.

Id. at 474.
Hines, 312 U.S. at 63 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 6o6 (1889)).
Id. at 64 (citing Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1875)).
Davidowitz, 3o F. Supp. at 471-72 (summarizing Pennsylvania's registration requirements).

169. Hines, 312 U.S. at 70-71170. Id. at 64-65.
171. Id. at 65 (citing Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 454-55 (1930)).
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states were allowed to enact their own immigration'registration systems,
then U.S. citizens might enjoy fewer rights abroad. As the Hines Court
stated:
Legal imposition of distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and
obligations upon aliens-such as subjecting them alone, though
perfectly law-abiding, to indiscriminate and repeated interception and
interrogation by public officials-thus bears an inseparable
relationship to the welfare and tranquility7 of
all the states, and not
merely to the welfare and tranquility of one. 2
In addition to exporting costs to travelers, Pennsylvania's registration
system would expose naturalized citizens like Mr. Davidowitz to
repeated police questioning. The Hines Court took particular issue with
the requirement that immigrants carry alien registration cards and
produce them on demand.'73 Explaining how the law implicated the
"personal liberties of law-abiding aliens," the Court feared that such a
system "would subject aliens to a system of indiscriminate questioning
similar to the espionage systems existing in other lands." 74
Beyond the negative externalities it generated, the Pennsylvania law
presented no opportunity for replication. As the Supreme Court noted,
"The basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical-registration
of aliens as a distinct group."' 7 When Pennsylvania enacted its law in
1939, several other states and localities already had registration systems
of their own.7 Congress allowed those experiments to percolate briefly,
and proceeded to adopt key components of some when it enacted the
federal Alien Registration Act.'77 By the time the Supreme Court
reviewed Pennsylvania's law, vertical replication had already occurred,
and, therefore, Pennsylvania's registration system presented no
opportunity for further policy development.
In Hines, the Supreme Court rejected a state immigration law that
failed to internalize costs or produce replicable results. Thirty-five years
later, the Court encountered a different state-based attempt to control
immigration. This time, the presence of both conditions resulted in an
enthusiastic endorsement of state experimentation.
2. De Canas v. Bica: Allowing Self-ContainedImmigration Trials
Long before the federal government required businesses to check
the immigration status of recently hired employees, California enforced
its own verification system. In 1971, California amended its labor code to
172. Id. at 65-66.
173. Id. at 71 n.32 (explaining how such requirements can lead to "tyranny and intimidation").
174. Id. at 74,71.
175. Id. at 61.

176. Id. at 61-62 n.8 (observing that some states and various municipalities had "recently
undertaken local alien registration").
177. Id. at 72-73 (discussing congressional debate over registration requirements).
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state, "No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled
to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have
an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.""' The following year, two
legal residents of California filed a complaint against an employer for
hiring unauthorized immigrants.
The state trial court dismissed the lawsuit on preemption grounds,
and the appellate court affirmed.179 In De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had not expressly or impliedly preempted
states from regulating employment relationships involving unauthorized
immigrants.'8 According to the De Canas Court, the goal of California's
verification system was internal: California sought to "protect workers
within the State."' 8 ' But even if a state enacts legislation designed to help
resident workers, the law can still create spillover problems for the
federal government if it effectively seizes control of national immigration
policy. Thus, opponents of the law argued that the means used to achieve
California's local objective hampered federal enforcement.IS2 The De
Canas Court disagreed, holding that California had not redirected
federal resources or otherwise altered immigration policy but had simply
enacted legislation designed to govern employment relationships within
the state.'8 3 Because the verification system had only a "speculative and
indirect impact on immigration," the state law did not cause the federal
government to lose regulatory control over immigration matters.4 In
other words, the De Canas Court found that California's law generated
no spillover problems-in the form of economic harm or policy
redirection-for the federal government.
The De Canas Court expressed concern for a different type of
externality. In contrast to California's internalized experiment, the Court
explained how the federal government's ongoing failure to control the
border had exported significant harms to the Golden State:
"Employment of illegal aliens in times of high unemployment deprives
citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by illegal aliens of
jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can
seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and
legally admitted aliens."'' Although these empirical claims remain

178. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1971), repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 946, § i (1988).
179. De Canas v. Bica, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444,446-47 (Ct. App. 1974).

180. 424 U.S. 351,365 (1976).
181. Id. at 356; see also id. at 363 ("[T]he state law [was] fashioned to remedy local problems.").
182. See Brief of Respondents, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1975) (No. 74-882), 1975 WL

173815, at *9 (arguing that California's law "could expel masses of aliens not entitled to lawful
residence to other states and across international borders").
183. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360-62.
184. See id. at 355.

185. Id. at 356-57.
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subject to vigorous debate,'" the De Canas Court's focus on
externalization was clear. According to the Court, California was
attempting to address a local problem-"the deleterious effects on its
economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens"-that the
federal government had created by failing to control the border.17
California's residents paid the price of federal underenforcement in the
form of de ressed wages and other "perceived evils" of illegal
immigration.' Thus, in contrast to the speculative nature of the
externalities created by California's law, the federal government's weak
border enforcement exported quantifiable costs to the state's economy
and workforce.
The De Canas Court's discussion of internalization differed sharply
from Hines. Unlike Pennsylvania's registration system, California's law
did not "impose[] burdens on aliens lawfully within the country," but
actually worked to improve employment prospects for legal residents.'"
Thus, although Pennsylvania's law exported harms to immigrants and
citizens by exposing them to ongoing police surveillance, California's
verification system was "designed to protect the opportunities of lawfully
admitted aliens for obtaining and holding jobs, rather than to add to their
burdens." "

After describing the law's low spillover costs, the De Canas Court
addressed the issue of replication. At the time De Canas was decided, at
least two other states had enacted immigration verification systems
similar to California's."' Reflecting on congressional inaction in this area,
the De Canas Court stated, "Congress believes this problem does not yet
require uniform national rules and is appropriately addressed by the
States as a local matter."'. Ten years after De Canas, Congress enacted
the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") of 1986, which
established a national immigration verification system that mirrored
previous state models.93 The different opportunities for vertical
replication presented in Hines and De Canas help explain the outcomes
in each case. At the time Hines was decided, Congress had already
186. See infra Part III.A and accompanying discussion of the debate over immigration
externalities.
187. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357; Brief of Petitioners, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (No. 74882), 1975 WL 173813, at *7 ("[T]he federal government's apparent ineffective control of illegal entry
by aliens makes the employment of illegal aliens a legitimate concern of the state.").
188. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357.
189. Id. at 363.
190. Id. at 358 n.6.

§ 31-51k (2011) (originally enacted in 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21(originally enacted in 1973), repealed by 20o0 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 136.

191. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

4409 (201)

192. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360 n.9 (emphasis added).
193. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(I)(A) (2oo6); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. Cm. LEGAL

F.

193, 193 n.2 (summarizing

early state attempts to regulate the employment of unauthorized immigrants).
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replicated Pennsylvania's law, thereby undermining the value of
additional state testing. In contrast, no national employment verification
system existed when the Supreme Court decided De Canas. Because
vertical replication had not yet taken place, the De Canas Court easily
allowed California to proceed with its experiment.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: Going the "Extra Mile" to
Avoid National Harm
Thirty-five years after its decision in De Canas, the Supreme
Court reviewed another state regulation involving unauthorized
immigrant workers. In 2007, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona
Workers Act, which prohibited employers from hiring unauthorized
immigrants.'94 In addition, the state law required employers to
electronically verify the immigration status of new hires and denied
business licenses to companies that employed unauthorized immigrants."
6
the Supreme Court held that
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,"9
federal law did not prohibit Arizona from enforcing its own immigration
verification rules. In doing so, the Whiting majority focused on the
externalities, or lack thereof, created by the state's immigration
experiment. The Court found that Arizona's verification law did not
interfere with federal priorities or otherwise expose residents to elevated
rates of discrimination. In other words, the state law was acceptable from
the perspective of experimental federalism because it did not export
costs to citizens or the United States.
The Whiting Court found that the federal government's
employment verification requirements could "operate[] unimpeded"
even with Arizona's parallel system in place.'" The United States had
contended that Arizona's law would weaken the government's ability to
centralize immigration enforcement decisions."' Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts observed that "our" system of federalism
necessarily entails "some departure from homogeneity" and that
Arizona's law maintained uniformity as best as possible by incorporating
federal immigration standards.'99
Just as Arizona's immigration regulations exported no costs to the
federal government, the Whiting Court found that the law did not harm
legal residents either. Critics had argued that Arizona's verification rules
would cause employers to avoid hiring "foreign-looking" or "foreign3.

194. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975-76 (2ol) (citing AMz. REV. STAT.
ANN.

§§

23-211, 23-212, 23-212.01 (Supp. 2010)).

195. Aiuz. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211, 23-212, 23-214 (Supp. 2010).
196. 131 S. Ct. at 1970.

197. Id. at 1983.
198. Id. at 1979.
199. Id. at 1980.
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sounding" individuals." Latinos and other lawful permanent residents
often bear the brunt of this form of discrimination.20 ' Acknowledging
these concerns, Chief Justice Roberts noted that federal and state laws
already prohibited businesses from making employment decisions based
on an employee's race or national origin.o2 According to the Whiting
Court, these existing antidiscrimination protections were sufficient to
prevent Arizona from externalizing harms to lawful residents."
The Court's cost analysis relied upon several questionable
empirical assumptions. For example, as Justices Breyer and Sotomayor
noted in dissent, the electronic verification system utilized by Arizona is
filled with errors, and such misclassifications disparately impact
particular cultural groups.2 o4 In addition, despite the Whiting majority's
hopeful forecast, the United States will almost certainly absorb some of
the costs created by Arizona's verification law as more states and
localities enact laws that demand verification information from the
federal government. Likewise, Congress's goal of centralizing
immigration verification decisions cannot be reconciled with the
patchwork of state and local laws that will expand after Whiting.o"
Although the Whiting Court addressed internalization-one
condition of valid experimentation -it failed to discuss the concept of
replication in any detail. Such an analysis would have revealed that
Arizona's experiment will not provide the nation with much helpful
information. Arizona's immigration law addresses a topic (employment
verification) that the federal government has already addressed
comprehensively. While acknowledging this fact, the Whiting majority
underplayed the monumental shift in immigration verification
requirements that had occurred after De Canas. When the Court
sanctioned California's immigration law in De Canas, Congress had not
yet banned employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants, thereby
expressing only "a peripheral concern with employment of illegal
entrants."" Accordingly, the likelihood of replication-the chance to
learn from state experiments involving immigration verification -was
high in De Canas. But ten years after De Canas, Congress passed the
IRCA and "forcefully made combating the employment of illegal aliens

200. Id. at 1990 (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION REFORM:
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 3, 37, 8o (1990)).
201. Id. at 1989 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. I, at 56 (1986)).
202. Id. at 1984-85 (majority opinion) ("The most rational path for employers is to obey the lawboth the law barring the employment of unauthorized aliens and the law prohibiting discrimination-and
there is no reason to suppose that Arizona employers will choose not to do so.").
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1991 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing errors within the federal electronic database);

id. at 2003 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (endorsing Justice Breyer's critique of the federal database).
205. Id. at 2ooo (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
206. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360, 360 n.9 (1976) (emphasis added).
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central to the policy of immigration law."" Thus, by the time the
Supreme Court reviewed Arizona's verification law in 2011,2" the Court
faced "a legal landscape ... significantly changed" by the IRCA." As
such, the breadth of the federal scheme left little room for Arizona to
innovate.
In fact, the state law's lack of originality played a key role in the
Whiting decision. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, Arizona's verification
requirements "closely track[ed] IRCA's provisions in all material
respects."2 o Further, the Court praised Arizona for going "the extra
mile" by utilizing the federal definition of "unauthorized alien" in the
state statute and relying exclusively on federal immigration
determinations."' Although Arizona's law deviated from certain federal
requirements by mandating electronic verification and raising the stakes
for wayward employers, these changes merely tinkered with the existing
federal framework. The state law did nothing to alter the fundamental
components of the federal system: workplace verification based on
employee-provided information.
On the other hand, if Arizona had been bolder with its verification
requirements (for example, by mandating biometric scans of new
employees"') courts would have quickly struck down the law. And so
goes the quandary of forced federalism: The more that states increase the
potential for replication through creative endeavors, the less likely that
courts will allow such tests to proceed. Even with these strictures in
place, however, past Supreme Court decisions had at least considered
whether state laws broke some distinct ground on immigration matters.
For example, the De Canas Court sanctioned California's law because it
governed employment relationships in a way that the federal government
had not, whereas the Hines Court struck down Pennsylvania's law
because it was nearly identical to the existing federal scheme. The
Whiting decision marked a stark break from this trend by ignoring the
concept of replication altogether.
A few lessons can be learned from reading Hines, De Canas, and
Whiting in conjunction: In determining the permissibility of various state
immigration laws, the Supreme Court has strongly disapproved of
experiments that export harms to the federal government or legal
207. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (citing INS v. Nat'l Ctr.
for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (19i)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1970.

Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1971 (comparing the definitions contained in the INA with those
contained in the Legal Arizona Workers Act).
211. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(11) (Supp. 2010)).
212. See, e.g., DoRis MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT
209.
210.

GENERATION OF E-VERIFY: GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 2 (2oo9) (recommending that

Congress adopt voluntary pilot programs that employ biometric testing).
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residents. In contrast to its continuous demand for internalization, the
Court has been less consistent in scrutinizing state immigration laws for
uniqueness or diversity. In addition to highlighting the trends and
contradictions in the Court's state immigration rulings, the concepts of
internalization and replication help resolve one of the defining issues of
today's immigration debate: whether local experiments can advance
national immigration goals.

III. EVALUATING CURRENT EXPERIMENTS
What is the value of state-based immigration experimentation?
From sanctuary states to restrictionist states, immigration laboratories are
now experimenting with numerous enforcement systems. This Part
examines the usefulness of these tests. Analyzing current state
immigration laws in light of the criteria outlined above, it considers
whether states can reach their innovative potential under a system of
forced federalism.
A. EXISTING EXTERNALITIES: THE COSTS OF FEDERAL UNDERENFORCEMENT
Those who support local enforcement of immigration laws assert
that states suffer the most from the federal government's failure to
control the border."' Their argument focuses on spillovers-that the
nation's failed immigration policies export significant costs to the states,
while doing relatively little damage to federal finances. Although this
claim remains disputed, it must be assessed before the externalities of
state immigration laws can be evaluated. After all, state enforcement
may generate externalities, but the significance of those costs has
meaning only in relation to the externalities created by the status quo.1 4
Thus, analyzing the harms generated by federal underenforcement
informs the relative costs of state control.2 "S
Proponents of local immigration control argue that the growth of
the unauthorized population harms states more than the federal
government because of disproportionate social service costs."'6 Although

213. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Remark, Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule
of Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1324
(2008) ("Without question, the most significant force driving action at the state and local level is a
fiscal one."); see also Gulasekaram,supra note 83, at 1444 (summarizing the states' frustration with
federal underenforcement of immigration laws).
214. See Hills, supra note 125, at 27 (arguing that courts should protect the country from costexporting states only if such protection is worth the price of federal gridlock that comes from
centralization).
215. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law:
Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 607, 654-55 (1985) (emphasizing the
need to compare spillovers caused by different regulatory approaches).
216. See Swati Agrawal, Trusts Betrayed: The Absent Federal Partner in Immigration Policy,
33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 755, 757-58 n.3 (1996) (summarizing restrictionist arguments on the fiscal harm
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most immigrants arrive in the United States through legal channels, the
percentage of the unauthorized population, relative to the overall
immigrant population, has increased dramatically during the last several
decades.' Currently, thirty percent of immigrants residing in the United
2,8
States lack legal status. The total number of unauthorized immigrants
has risen to over eleven million people, constituting a four-fold increase
since 1980.219

Peter Schuck is a leading proponent of the view that illegal
immigration impacts states more than the federal government.22 o He
acknowledges that "[i]llegal immigration ... confers significant benefits
on almost all concerned""' but argues that those benefits are distributed
unevenly between the two levels of government. Schuck describes a
"fiscal mismatch under which most tax revenues generated by
immigrants, both legal and illegal, flow to Washington... while almost
all of the costs ... are borne locally.""2 This mismatch harms some states
more than others.22 3 Roughly half of all unauthorized immigrants in the
United States live in four states: California, Florida, New York, and
Texas.224 But these numbers are changing. Shifting migration patterns
have caused the unauthorized populations in many states to grow
significantly." According to restrictionists, as these trends continue and
unauthorized immigrants reside in more jurisdictions, an increasing
number of states will suffer from illegal immigration's fiscal drain.
Although they differ on the net effects of immigration, economists
generally agree that the federal government suffers less (or gains more)
than the states from illegal immigration.226 There are several reasons why
a growing unauthorized population might benefit the federal
caused by illegal immigration).
217. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEw HISPANIC CTR.,

A

PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED

IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2009).

218. Id.

(20o0); see also
supra note 217, at i (noting that the number of new unauthorized immigrants entering
the United States declined recently but that the overall number of unauthorized residents remains at
historically high levels).
220. See Schuck, supra note 34, at 80 (discussing the fiscal impact of illegal immigration); see also
Huntington, supra note 13, at 805 n-70 (examining arguments regarding the uneven distribution of
costs among levels of government).
221. Peter H. Schuck, Law and the Study of Migration, in MIGRATION THEORY: TALKING ACROSS
DISCIPLINES 197 (Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield eds., ist ed. 2000).
222. Schuck, supra note 34, at 8o.
223. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 17, at 462-63 (arguing that the political and fiscal problems
created by illegal immigration remain concentrated in a few states); Schuck, supra note 34, at 79-80
(same).
224. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 217, at I-2 (noting that two-thirds of unauthorized immigrants
reside in eight states).
225. Id. at 2 (discussing changing migration patterns).
226. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraitsof the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue,44 GA. L.
REv. 65, 154 (2009) (discussing the economic impact of illegal immigration).
219. PEw HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS AND ARIZONA'S NEW IMMIGRATION LAW 2

PASSEL & COHN,
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government. Immigrants are generally younger than the native
populations of the industrialized countries to which they move,"
meaning that they help prevent workforce declines and contribute to
retirement systems burdened by aging populations.

For example, in the

United States, unauthorized immigrants pay $7 billion into Medicare and
Social Security funds each year, most of which they never claim.' Some
economists cite these revenue sources as evidence of a "fiscal windfall"
for the federal government, while others maintain that illegal
immigration still causes net harm to the federal budget.23 o
Conclusions are even less clear at the state level. Like all residents,
unauthorized immigrants consume public services such as emergency
health care, law enforcement assistance, and public education. Those
favoring state immigration laws correctly note that states and localities
provide these services.23 ' Although unauthorized immigrants pay for
many of these local expenditures through consumption taxes,"' studies
have reached opposite conclusions as to the net effect of the tax receipts
generated by unauthorized immigrants."' The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) recently released the most comprehensive analysis of the
impact of illegal immigration on state and local budgets.234 After
reviewing twenty-seven studies on the subject, the CBO concluded that
unauthorized immigrants have a negative (though modest) impact on
state and local budgets because they consume more in services than they
227. See Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1472-73 (explaining how illegal immigration contributes
to national economic growth); Shayana Kadidal, "Federalizing"Immigration Law: InternationalLaw
as a Limitation on Congress's Power to Legislate in the Field of Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 501,
501-02 (2008) (summarizing several recent studies pointing to net economic gains generated by
immigration); Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 5o, 58 (2oo6) (attributing $700
billion growth in U.S. gross domestic product to immigration).
228. Kadidal, supra note 227, at 502 (discussing the economic impact of illegal immigration on
industrialized countries); Alexander T. Tabarrok, Economic and Moral Factors in Favor of Open
Immigration, THE INDEP. INST. (Sept. 14, 2000), http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=486

(arguing that economists generally agree on immigration's wealth-enhancing effects).
229. RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL Fix, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: MYTHS AND REALITY I (2005); see

also Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security with Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

5, 2005, at Ai (describing the Social Security Administration's annual revenue from illegal
immigration).
230. Compare Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal,
and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. I, 7 1-30 (2oo6) (discussing positive contributions
of unauthorized immigrants to federal revenue), with STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, THE HIGH COST OF CHEAP LABOR: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 5 (2004)

(arguing that illegal immigration causes net harm to the federal budget).
231. See Kobach, supra note 17, at 460 (describing public education as the most expensive service
consumed by unauthorized immigrants).
232. CAPPS & Fix, supra note 229, at I (explaining how unauthorized immigrants generate revenue
for state and local governments).
233. See Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1472-73 (discussing the economic impact of illegal
immigration on states and localities).
234. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1-2 (2007).
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pay in taxes."' Although other studies have found that illegal
immigration significantly benefits state budgets,' these empirical
questions already have been answered in the public's mind. Roughly
three-quarters of Americans believe unauthorized immigrants harm the
economy by failing to pay taxes and utilizing services at hospitals and
schools.3
If indeed states bear the financial brunt of the nation's failed
immigration policies, this outcome might explain the federal
government's failure to enforce existing immigration laws.3' As noted
above, economic theory posits that all things being equal, policymakers
over-engage in activities that yield negative externalities and avoid
legislation that creates positive spillovers."' Thus, according to this
theory, federal policymakers would be drawn to an immigration scheme
that ensures federal tax receipts generated by illegal immigration, while
forcing the states to pay for services consumed by unauthorized
immigrants.24 o Under such a system, the federal government would have
very little economic incentive to control the border or enact legislation
that would result in a more equitable division of expenses.24 1 The less that
voters force politicians to pay for these cost-exporting policies, the more
likely legislators will continue to support the status quo.242
Critics of today's state immigration laws tend to ignore the
externalities produced by the existing system of underenforcement. This
is a mistake. Without knowing the price of federal inaction, the relative
price of state immigration laws will remain unknown as well. More
important, discounting the costs of the status quo means disregarding the
primary motivation for today's restrictionist efforts. This inhibits a
meaningful evaluation of the claims made on both sides of the
immigration debate. State enforcement models may generate
externalities, but those externalities might pale in comparison to current
235. Id. at 3 (noting the difficulty in generating precise estimates on the fiscal impact of illegal
immigration).
236. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF TEX., UNDOCUMENTED
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE STATE BUDGET AND ECONOMY

IMMIGRANTS IN TEXAS: A

1(2oo6)

(concluding that the

Texas budget benefits from illegal immigration).
237. See Randal C. Archibold & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concern Among
Americans About Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 20o0, at A15 (summarizing poll results showing
strong support for immigration reform).

238. See Agrawal, supra note 216, at 759 ("The federal government appears to have adopted an
agenda to shift the risks and the costs of illegal immigration to the states.").
239. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion of the incentives created by externalization.
240. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Federal-StateDevelopments in Immigration Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 387, 390 (2002) (arguing that illegal immigration generates very little tax revenue for
states).

241. See Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1473 (considering whether the concentration of costs at

the local level has led to an increase in subnational immigration legislation).
242. See Pettys, supra note III, at 499 (discussing political incentives to enact policies that
generate high externalities).
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costs. Or, conversely, laboratory states may do greater damage to
national finances and objectives than the current system of
underenforcement. Addressing these questions, the following Parts
evaluate the costs of state immigration laws.
B.

PAYING THE PRICE OF ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT

States and localities that enact their own immigration regulations
appear to absorb many of the expenses generated by their policies. For
example, if a decline in the unauthorized population causes the price of
goods and services to rise with increased labor costs, then local residents
will ultimately pay for their jurisdiction's policy decision. Likewise, if a
state enacts controversial legislation that causes out-of-state companies
to cease doing business with it or prevents travelers from going there,
then local residents and businesses will experience the economic
ramifications of enhanced enforcement.
Conversely, if states successfully reduce rates of illegal immigration
in their jurisdictions, then they might enjoy certain positive internalities
such as improved job markets for local workers or newly available public
funds that previously financed programs used by unauthorized
immigrants. Either way, states and localities that internalize the gains
and losses of their experiments are more likely to generate useful data on
the effectiveness of their tests. If these assumptions hold true, then
current state immigration laws would seem to be ideal subjects for
experimentation.
Several recent state and local immigration efforts demonstrate
internalization at work. For example, when Riverside, New Jersey,
enacted a restrictionist measure in 2006, it became the first municipality
in the state to penalize employers who hired unauthorized immigrants
and landlords who rented to them.243 Hundreds of Brazilian and other
immigrants reportedly fled the town soon after the ordinance was
enacted, leaving behind restaurants, corner stores, and other companies
that depended on their business.' After accruing substantial legal bills
defending the law, Riverside cut costs by deferring road maintenance
and construction projects." Roughly one year after enacting the
ordinance, with stores closing and businesses suffering weekly losses
estimated at $50,ooo, the township rescinded the law.246 This series of
events can be seen through the prism of experimental federalism: After

243. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at AI.
244. Id.
245. Id. at A22.

246. Id. at At (noting that some residents believed the law worked "too well"); see also Jill P.
Capuzzo, Immigrants Hated Law, and Now It's Repealed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at B2;
Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1473-74 (describing Riverside's "self-inflicted economic woes").
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internalizing the economic costs of its policy, Riverside decided that the
negative internalities generated by its experiment outweighed any gains
associated with enhanced enforcement.
Oklahoma provides another recent example of internalities
operating at the subnational level. In 2007, Oklahoma enacted a law that
required employers to verify the immigration status of new hires and
encouraged local police to cooperate with federal officials in immigration
enforcement.247 Soon after these provisions became law, reports began to
circulate that large numbers of immigrants (both legal and unauthorized)
were leaving Oklahoma, thereby causing worker shortages in industries
such as agriculture and construction.24' Local businesses expressed fear
that they would be forced to raise wages and prices to compensate for
the changes.'49 One estimate predicted that the new law would cause a
$1.8 billion drop in Oklahoma's gross state product each year.25 o These
problems were compounded by the fact that citizens seemed unable or
unwilling to fill openings created by the exodus of immigrant workers."'
As a result, employers in certain sectors paid significant overtime
premiums to those employees who remained.' Not all residents opposed
these outcomes; supporters argued that legal residents would eventually
benefit because Oklahoma would no longer have to fund social services
used by unauthorized immigrants.' For these Oklahomans, the price of
enduring certain economic hardships was well worth reestablishing the
rule of law in their state.254
Like Oklahoma, Arizona has paid a high price for its recent
immigration law. Protesters have launched sophisticated boycott
campaigns against the state, many of which are modeled after antiapartheid efforts directed at South Africa in the 198os.'" Musical artists
and other performers have refused to appear in Arizona, and many cities
including Austin, Berkeley, Bloomington, Boston, Chicago, Durham, El
Paso, Hartford, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco have

247. See H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., ist Sess. §§ 2-3 (Okla. 2007); McCormick, supra note 5, at 340-42

(summarizing key provisions of the Oklahoma law); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594
F-3d 742, 750 (loth Cir. 2oo) (enjoining provisions of the Oklahoma law).

248. McCormick, supra note 5, at 346-47 (describing the economic impact of the Oklahoma law).
249. Bazar, supra note I3, at A2 (describing business declines in Oklahoma).
250. See EcoN. IMPACT GROUP, A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (CGE) ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF THE OKLAHOMA TAXPAYER AND CmZEN PROTECTION AcT OF 2oo7, at 17 (2oo8) (concluding
that the drop in gross state product would "likely remain in the system for many years").
251. Bazar, supra note 13, at At.
252. Id. (discussing worker shortages in Oklahoma).
253. Id. (summarizing economic claims made by critics and supporters of Oklahoma's law).
254. McCormick, supra note 5, at 347-48.
255. See Eve Conant, Raising Arizona, NEWSWEEK, Aug.

16, 20o, at 34-35 (discussing division
between conservative business groups and restrictionist groups in Arizona); see also Julia Preston,
Latino Groups Urge Boycott of Arizona over New Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 20o0, at A16 (explaining
how critics obtained pledges from businesses to stop doing business with Arizona).
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officially condemned the law or refused to do business with Arizona.256 In
addition, at least forty organizations have cancelled their conferences
and conventions in Arizona.5 These cancellations are predicted to cost
$90 million over five years in Phoenix alone."'" Such direct harms are
coupled with lost growth opportunities. For instance, although Arizona
was trying to expand its presence in the biotech and solar-energy
industries, local leaders fear that the reputational harm caused by the
immigration law might halt progress in those areas-an especially painful
price to pay in a weak economy.259 Similar dynamics are at play in Utah
and Georgia, where state legislatures have recently passed restrictionist
immigration legislation.'6
In addition to internalizing economic harms, restrictionist states may
impair relationships between law enforcement agencies and immigrant
communities. Immigrants are far less likely to report crimes if the fear of
deportation looms over their interactions with the police.16 ' Thus, many
immigrants who already hold skeptical views of law enforcement officers
are even less likely to come forward in jurisdictions that have deputized
local police officers as immigration agents."' These circumstances not
only endanger the well-being of unauthorized immigrants and their
family members, many of whom have legal status,"3 but also harm
citizens by diverting police resources away from other criminal matters
and reducing the number of witnesses available to assist with criminal
investigations."4

256. See Conant, supra note 255, at 35; Tamar Jacoby, An Immigration Standoff, L.A. TIMES, June
21, 201o, at Ai5; Who Is Boycotting Arizona?, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 27, 20Io), http://www.azcentral.com/

business/articles/2oloo5/13/201005I3immigration-boycotts-list.html (describing boycott activity).
257. See Conant, supra note 255, at 34-35 (summarizing business leaders' concerns regarding the
economic ramifications of the Arizona law).
258. See Randal C. Archibold, Phoenix Counts Big Boycott Cost, N.Y. TIMEs, May 12, 2olo, at AIS
(noting that several civil rights groups have urged travelers to avoid Arizona).
259. See Conant, supra note 255, at 34-35 (discussing efforts to boycott the state).
260. Michael W. Savage, Utah Straddling a New Line on Illegal Residents, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
2oo, at At (discussing fears in Utah about the negative economic impact caused by state immigration
legislation); Ernie Suggs, Illegal Immigration:City Council Seeks Veto of State Bill, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 20, 2011, at BI (describing potential boycotts and canceled conventions in Atlanta that might result
from new restrictionist legislation modeled after Arizona's immigration law).
261. Cf Hiroshi Motomura, Essay, Immigration Outside the Law, io8 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 204546 (2oo8) (summarizing debates over the value of local enforcement).
262. See RODRfGUEZ & CHISsTI, supra note 88, at 37-38 (discussing policy concerns raised by local
enforcement efforts).
263. See Pham, supra note 6o, at 983; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery:
Immigrant Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 44 (2oo8) (explaining that

many unauthorized immigrants live in "mixed status" families).
264. See Pham, supra note 6o, at 983 (arguing that local immigration enforcement harms both
witnesses and crime victims); see also Keblawi, supra note 92, at 846 (discussing how local immigration
enforcement hampers community policing); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of
ImmigrationLaws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004) (same).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1714

[Vol.

62: 1673

Although these scenarios involve very real dangers to in-state
residents, they could conceivably serve as useful instances of
internalization.6

After

all,

if the

price

of enhanced

immigration

enforcement weakens police officers' capabilities to protect citizens, then
a restrictionist state might reconsider its immigration experiment.
Likewise, if laws requiring police officers to verify the immigration status
of suspects prevent police officers from focusing on more important
criminal matters, then some states might target their efforts elsewhere.
Or, conversely, local residents might be willing to accept these costs as
necessary consequences of reducing illegal immigration in their
jurisdictions.
But the foregoing examples fail to tell the full story of
internalization. The fact that a state suffers some harm from
experimentation does not negate the possibility that sister states and the
federal government may still bear additional costs associated with state
immigration laws. In other words, the existence of internalization does
not speak to a laboratory state's level of internalization. Laboratory
states certainly pay some price for their experiments, but they export
other harms as well. Therefore, any rational assessment of the
experimental value of these tests depends on knowing the full extent of
costs flowing in and out of these jurisdictions. In order to make this
determination, the negative externalities of state immigration laws ought
to be considered as well.
C.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SPILLOVERS

State immigration regulations export costs in a number of ways. By
demanding federal attention, restrictionist states inevitably draw federal
resources away from their nonexperimenting neighbors, thereby altering
national immigration priorities. Likewise, by encouraging unauthorized
immigrants to resettle elsewhere, laboratory states export the economic
damage allegedly caused by illegal immigration. In addition to generating
economic spillovers, laboratory states export identity-based harms to the
nation. State immigration laws cause many immigrants and citizens to
ally themselves with those jurisdictions that match their immigration
enforcement preferences. Although Americans increasingly sort
themselves by race, ethnicity, and ideology, current immigration
experiments hasten these movements. These social and economic costs
raise serious questions about the utility of replicating state immigration
laws on a national scale.

265. See Rodriguez, supra note 53, at 639 (arguing that localities with anti-immigrant regulations
will be more likely to accept immigrants if they "come to feel the consequences of excluding
immigrants").
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i. ConstrainingFederalDiscretion
Laboratory states do not pay for the full cost of their immigration
laws. Consider measures that require local police to determine the
immigration status of certain suspects.' 6 States that establish these
requirements depend on the Department of Homeland Security's Law
Enforcement Support Center ("LESC") for verification information.'6
Located in Williston, Vermont, the LESC employs ICE agents who field
calls from state and federal agents regarding the immigration status of
suspects.'" The LESC cannot ignore requests coming from laboratory
states. Federal law states that agents "shall respond to an inquiry by a
Federal, State, or local government agency ... by providing the
requested verification or status information."
At first glance, states that mandate status checks do not appear to
generate any kind of externality. After all, the federal government
created the LESC and required ICE agents to respond to state requests.
If anything, it was Congress-not the states-that imposed the costs of
immigration verification on the federal government. But this argument
ignores natural capacity restrictions placed on any information-sharing
system like the LESC. As the number of requests coming from
laboratory states increases, other federal priorities must yield. In fact,
given that the LESC employs a fixed number of people, an increase in
verification requests from laboratory states could produce several
externalities. If Congress appropriates additional funding to allow the
LESC to answer more queries, then laboratory states will have exported
unanticipated verification costs to the federal government. If Congress
does not appropriate additional funds, ICE might transfer more agents to
the LESC, or simply force existing LESC staff to handle the increased
call volume. Both scenarios result in state-generated externalities.
If ICE refuses to move additional personnel to the LESC, then the
increased number of verification requests will result in longer response
times, thereby undermining the federal government's ability to quickly
address high-priority threats to national security and public safety.' In
addition to answering calls from from state police, the LESC also fields
queries from the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service."' The more requests
coming from laboratory states, the longer it will take to respond to each
266. See supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying discussion of recent state laws requiring immigration
status checks.
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d)(I)(A) (2oo6); see also McKanders, supra note 52, at 17 (explaining how
local police officers can obtain information about a suspect's immigration status).
268. See Kobach, supra note 17, at 479 (noting that state verification laws require consultation with
the LESC).
269. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2oo6) (emphasis added).
270. Decl. of David C. Palmatier 1 17, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 98o (D. Ariz.
200) (No. CV bo-141 3 -PHX-SRB).
271. Id. 4-5; see also id. 1 17 ("These are critical missions which cannot be allowed to fail.").
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inquiry. Conversely, if ICE moves agents away from their immigration
posts in other parts of the country in order to meet the growing demands
at LESC headquarters, then certain regions will lose valuable
enforcement resources. Laboratory states do not pay for either cost. As
more states experiment with immigration verification laws, more
instances of resource redirection will occur as well.2 72
The same dynamic is at work when local officials attempt to transfer
suspected unauthorized immigrants to ICE custody. Recognizing the
federal government's need to apprehend unauthorized immigrants who
are arrested for state crimes, Congress authorized ICE to create response
teams to take custody of suspects from local police departments. 7 ' The
response teams are distributed throughout the country and react quickly
to local requests in most instances.2 74 But states that enact their own
immigration laws constrain the federal government's discretion to assign
response teams to particular geographic regions based on national
priorities. ICE has approximately 3ooo agents dedicated to interior
enforcement, and those agents cannot be in two places at once.7 When
police departments in restrictionist states issue more requests for
assistance, ICE faces the difficult choice of sending more agents to these
states (pulling resources away from nonlaboratory states) or failing to
respond to the requests of restrictionist states. The first option generates
obvious costs for sister states by diverting federal enforcement resources
away from their jurisdictions.
As to the second option, ICE might refuse to send response teams
to laboratory states. But this decision would generate a different type of
externality by diminishing trust levels between state and federal
authorities if certain calls for help go unanswered."'6 Police departments
in other states might observe these interactions and eventually become
less willing to assist federal agents.7 Thus, whether they attract or repel
272. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996 n-7 (D. Ariz. 201o), affd, 641 F-3d 339
(9th Cir. 2011) (explaining how state immigration laws burden federal resources).
273. Kobach, supra note 59, at 205-06 (characterizing quick response teams as examples of
cooperative state-federal efforts). But see Pham, supra note 6o, at 984 (noting that some police
departments are skeptical of the federal government's ability to assist with immigration enforcement).
274. Kobach, supranote 59, at 205 (summarizing response times and arrest rates of quick response
teams).
275. See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal

Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155, 156-57 (2oo8) (arguing that current staffing levels do

not allow for effective immigration enforcement); see also Parlow, supra note 13, at lo62-63
(describing the "untapped potential" of local police to enforce immigration laws given the small
number of federal agents).
276. See Pham, supra note 60, at 984-85 (citing local fears that the federal government is
ambivalent about immigration enforcement).
277. See Decl. of Daniel H. Ragsdale 45, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz.
2010) (No. CV Io-1413-PHX-SRB) (discussing historical distrust between some law enforcement
agencies and federal immigration agents); see also Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-RelatedState and
Local Ordinances:Preemption, Prejudice,and the ProperRole for Enforcement, 2007 U. Cm. LEGAL F.
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federal agents, state immigration laws externalize costs by altering
federal priorities and harming state-federal relations.
Critics might challenge the foregoing argument that state
immigration laws disrupt any sort of carefully considered set of federal
priorities. According to one standard critique of the current state of U.S.
immigration policy, the existing system of purposeful underenforcement
should not be mistaken for thoughtful discretion."' But this argument
ignores federal primacy over immigration matters. Like it or not,
Congress has granted discretion over enforcement decisions to the
Department of Homeland Security-not the states."' In exercising those
powers, the federal government maintains exclusive control over
decisions involving discretionary enforcement and the allocation of
resources.2" States may be harmed by the growing unauthorized
populations that result from these decisions, but the externalities
generated by the current system should not allow states to exercise
discretion over matters that are not theirs to control. In other words, the
harms that states incur because of federal underenforcement cannot
justify experiments that direct federal resources away from sister states
or alter policies that remain exclusively within the federal domain.
Interstate Migration
Beyond hindering national enforcement priorities, state immigration
laws generate economic spillovers as well. Mounting evidence suggests
that recent immigration measures have caused immigrants to leave
restrictive states and localities.21' For example, after Riverside, New
Jersey, passed its immigration ordinance in 2oo6, an estimated ooo of
the township's 8ooo residents departed. Similarly, 15,000 to 25,000
unauthorized immigrants left Tulsa County, Oklahoma, after the state
passed sweeping immigration legislation in 2007.283 The same exodus
occurred in Arizona when the state's immigrant population declined by
2.

27, 35-36 (arguing that subnational enforcement undermines national immigration goals).
278. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 34, at 8o (considering whether stronger state enforcement works
against the "real" federal immigration policy of inaction).
279. See Rick Su, Notes on the Multiple Facets of Immigration Federalism, 15 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 179, 199-200 (2oo8) (discussing federal primacy over immigration enforcement and the
secondary consequences created by state control).
280. Pham, supra note 6o, at 996-97 (explaining why federal exclusivity facilitates a unitary
immigration policy).
281. Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 777, 814-15 (2oo8)
(discussing states and localities that have experienced a reduction in immigrant populations since
enacting restrictive measures).
282. See id. at 814.
283. See McCormick, supra note 5, at 346-48 (noting that some citizens and legal residents also left
Oklahoma because of the state's immigration law); see also Rodriguez, supra note 53, at 638 (assuming
that immigrants leave restrictive localities for other communities in the United states).

1718

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:I1673

eighteen percent in 2008 (as compared to a seven percent decline
nationally) after an employment verification law took effect.8
Most of the immigrants fleeing restrictive jurisdictions are likely to
resettle in other parts of the United States rather than return to their
countries of origin. The fact that more states have become immigrant
destinations in the last decade reflects the increasing viability of domestic
migration.8 In addition, stronger controls at the southern border have
created perverse incentives for unauthorized immigrants who reside in
the United States to remain in the country rather than risk the dangers
associated with reentry.'"These factors mean that state immigration laws
will probably divert immigrants to other parts of the country rather than
cause them to emigrate altogether."'
Because most immigrants will not "self-deport" as restrictionists
claim, but rather resettle in friendlier states, jurisdictions that enact strict
immigration laws necessarily create spillover problems for sister states.
As explained above, supporters of enhanced enforcement assert that
illegal immigration generates an enormous mismatch between federal
revenues and state expenditures."" If the restrictionists' claims are
correct, then local immigration laws naturally foist economic hardships
on the states that receive migrants fleeing from laboratory states.
Although critics might argue that these immigrant-friendly states can
avoid such problems simply by following suit and enacting their own
immigration laws, this is really no answer from the perspective of
experimental federalism. After all, how are receiving states supposed to
determine the costs and benefits of enhanced enforcement if states that
trigger migrations do not pay for their own experiments? The utility of
these tests remains indeterminate precisely because of the spillover
problems they create. Pushing immigrants to an ever-narrowing set of
284. Daniel GonzAlez, Questions over Drop in Migrant Population, AIz. REPUBLIC (Feb. 21, 2010),
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/200/o2/21/2o00o22iundocpop.html
(reporting
that in 2oo8, Arizona's immigrant population declined more than any other state); see also Huyen Pham,
When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 11I5, 1126 (2009) (describing an immigrant exodus

from Arizona).
285. Cox, supra note ioi, at 389-91 (summarizing immigrants' growing settlement options within
the United States); Huntington, supra note 13, at 806 (discussing increased migration to the Mountain
West and Southeast).
286. See Doris Meissner & James W. Ziglar, Why Arizona Had to Be Challenged, WASH. PosT, July
22, 20Io, at Ai9 (discussing the unintended consequences of heightened border enforcement).
287. See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & AARON TERRAZAS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRANTS
AND THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIs: RESEARCH EVIDENCE, PoucY CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS II
(2009) (discussing the effect of state restrictions and selective enforcement policies on migration
patterns).
288. See Kobach, supra note 275, at 157 ("And when the jobs dry up, unauthorized aliens selfdeport."); see also Motomura, supra note 261, at 2058 (tracing the phrase "self-deportation" to former
California Governor Pete Wilson).
289. See supra Part III.A and accompanying discussion of the externalities generated by federal
underenforcement of immigration laws.
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welcoming states will not enhance the value of these tests, but instead
will continue to obscure the true costs of state immigration laws.
3. Redefining National Identity
Beyond economic and policy costs, state immigration laws export
identity-based harms to the nation. These social externalities are rarely
discussed by those who tout the virtues of citizen movement. Drawing on
the work of economist Charles Tiebout,"" proponents of competitive
federalism argue that decentralized power enables states and localities to
distinguish themselves from one another by offering different levels of
taxes and services to attract residents.2 91 If subnational bodies offer
unique combinations of programs, then nonresidents can "vote with their
feet" by moving to areas that match their policy preferences.' In
essence, competitive federalism provides an economic rationale for state
experimentation by explaining how diverse local policies work in tandem
with a mobile citizenry to maximize social utility."
Echoing many of these contentions, proponents of local control
describe immigration law as a fruitful area for interjurisdictional
competition. For example, Cristina Rodriguez has argued that the nation
benefits from "population sorting in which immigrants settle in
welcoming communities."294 According to Rodriguez, citizens that view
immigration in a positive light should be allowed to express their
welcoming preferences, while those who hold opposing views ought to be
allowed to act on their restrictive urges in order to keep their negative
sentiments from festering.295 Peter Spiro has also endorsed this kind of
sorting and predicted that, if given the freedom to choose, most states
will experiment with more immigrant-friendly measures.296
290.

See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416

(1956).
291. See Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in
Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS

1161, 11164-65 (2009) (describing localities as goods that citizens can select); Pettys, supra note III,

at 481 (explaining how federalism scholars have employed Tiebout's theory to argue for decentralized
decisionmaking).
292. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, I15 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART I, 3 (2005), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/446.pdf (discussing the connection
between Tiebout's theory and state experimentation); Siegel, supra note 12o, at 1649-50 (arguing that
decentralized power promotes political accountability).
293. See Choper & Yoo, supra note 32, at 33 (discussing the role citizen choice plays in selecting an
optimal level of services); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. I, 18 (2oo3); see also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSTITUTION 127-29 (2ooo) (explaining how competitive federalism leads to population sorting).
294. Rodriguez, supra note 53, at 639.
295. Id. ("Such competition might make for better integration in the long run."); see also
Huntington, supra note 13, at 831-33 (explaining how states can learn from experimentation but
warning that these experiments might undermine federal goals).
296. Spiro, supra note 14, at 1640 ("[Tjhe prospect of a race to the bottom is slight."); see also
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But these endorsements largely ignore the national costs associated
with state-induced migration. In fact, allowing states to engage in
experiments that either welcome or repel immigrants threatens to
undermine national cohesion in a number of ways. Current racial and
ethnic divisions involving state immigration enforcement represent some
of these externalities. For example, seventy percent of white Americans
support Arizona's recent immigration law, as compared to just thirty-one
percent of Latinos.297 Over eighty percent of the public believes that the
law is somewhat or very likely to lead to racial profiling."'
Understandably, then, eighty percent of young Latino voters fear that
they will be discriminated against, and most do not believe that the
police treat Latinos fairly.299
State immigration laws exacerbate these anxieties. Consider the
danger of racial profiling. Members of the national community share a
near-universal opposition to racially tinged law enforcement practices.
Although federal agents are certainly capable of engaging in racial
profiling, the risk increases substantially when state police officers
enforce immigration laws that are outside their areas of expertise.
Immigration regulations are incredibly complex, and there are numerous
reasons why certain suspects may not possess official paperwork but
nevertheless maintain a valid right to remain in the United States. For
example, some residents may be in the process of requesting asylum or
adjusting their immigration status but lack the forms needed to
demonstrate their transitional status."
Because state police officers have not received the training to make
these nuanced determinations, they are more likely to detain people who
"look" or "sound" like unauthorized immigrants."o' Recent police
guidelines on this topic only increase the likelihood of racial profiling.
Some training manuals advise law enforcement officers to look for
unauthorized immigrants who have "thick foreign accent[s]," travel in

Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties,35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 17374 (994) (discussing the benefits of immigration-related sorting) [hereinafter Spiro, DemiSovereignties].
297. See NBC Nightly News: A Nation Divided (television broadcast May 26, 2010) (reporting
results of an MSNBC-Telemundo poll); see also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Is Stoking Unease
Among Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 20o0, at Asn (discussing immigration enforcement and
allegations of racial profiling).
298. See Arizona's Immigration Crackdown: The Backlash Begins, EcONOMIST, May 8, 2olo, at 3132 (discussing racial and ethnic divisions over Arizona's immigration law).
299. See Howard Fineman, Showdown in Arizona: Obama Must Pursue Immigration Reform,
NEWSWEEK, June 14, 2oo, at 18; see also PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 219, at 3-4 (discussing reports

of discrimination against Latinos).
300. See Manheim, supra note 46, at 975-77 (explaining why the complexity of federal immigration
laws makes state enforcement difficult).
301. Pham, supra note 284, at 1156 (examining the highly discretionary nature of immigration
enforcement).
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crowded vehicles, wear heavy clothing in hot weather, stand in areas with
other unauthorized immigrants, or otherwise look "out of place."3 o2
These guidelines rely on nondescript factors that do not meaningfully
assist police in distinguishing between unauthorized immigrants and legal
residents. Without clearer instructions, many local law enforcement
agents will be tempted to fall back on racial and ethnic cues such as
accent and skin color to identify suspects." Preliminary studies indicate
that some police officers in laboratory states have already engaged in this
kind of profiling by stopping Latinos for minor traffic violations at higher
rates than other residents.0 4
The costs associated with profiling and selective enforcement are
not confined to unauthorized immigrants, but extend to citizens and legal
permanent residents as well."o Status-holding residents may decide to
exit laboratory states in order to join other departing family members or
simply because they do not want to live in a state with ongoing
immigration inspections. In addition, when police use race and ethnicity
as factors in making immigration-related traffic stops, many legal
permanent residents will be forced to repeatedly prove their status as
legitimate members of their communities-precisely the cost that the
Supreme Court warned against in Hines v. Davidowitz when it
emphasized the need to "protect the personal liberties of law-abiding
aliens ... and to leave them free from the possibility of inquisitorial
practices and police surveillance."6
In sum, state immigration laws generate three separate divisions
that fall along racial and ethnic lines: (I) profiling and selective
enforcement; (2) the actual movement of immigrants, most of whom are
Latino, away from restrictionist states; and (3) public attitudes about
these trends. These developments threaten to shake loose the nation's
basic conception of a shared identity. Americans pride themselves on
being members of a national community." As Kenneth Karst has noted,
302. See Archibold, supra note 297, at Ass (summarizing training materials given to local law
enforcement agencies engaged in cooperative immigration enforcement); Amanda Lee Myers,
Lawsuit Targets Arizona Police Training: The Seventh Challenge to Immigration Law Takes a New
Tack, Hous. CHRON., July II, 20oo, at A8 (discussing critiques of police training materials).
303. See Wishnie, supra note 264, at I02-03 (examining the risks of racial profiling associated with
state immigration enforcement).
304. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 69, at 5 (discussing evidence
of racial profiling by local police engaged in cooperative immigration enforcement); McCormick,
supra note 5, at 343-44 (summarizing study by Oklahoma's Human Rights Commissioner on the
uneven racial effects of the state's new immigration law).
305. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 40 (2oo4)
(discussing expressive injuries that citizens experience because of racial discrimination).
306. 312 U.S. 52, 74 (94).
307. See Motomura, Federalism,supra note so, at 1374 (explaining why the self-definitional aspect
of immigration law provides a strong rationale for federal exclusivity); Hiroshi Motomura, Book
Review, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567,
1583-84 (1997) (arguing for a broad definition of national membership).
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state and federal laws help define national membership by establishing a
set of rules that govern all members of the community.' This legal
compact not only establishes mutual obligations based on community
standards, it engenders among residents a sense of loyalty and
commitment to one another.3 o
It might appear that state immigration laws do not interfere with
this goal."o In fact, it could be argued that restrictionist states uphold
these shared national values by sorting residents who, based on
nationally defined immigration laws, do not belong. But this assertion
misstates the nature of national membership. Federal law is concerned
not only with the admission of foreign nationals but also with the
treatment of all people who are territorially present."' For example,
unauthorized immigrants remain "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' They enjoy a host of other constitutional rights and can
engage in certain social and economic activities without state
interference'.3 " This is not to say that unauthorized immigrants are full
members of society. Quite to the contrary, their legal protections remain
constrained, and Americans hold a largely ambivalent attitude toward
their presence.3 14 But even with these limitations, the nation has extended
certain basic protections to unauthorized immigrants out of a deeply held
commitment to antidiscrimination and anticaste principles.3 '
The divisions that arise from state immigration laws do not resemble
the utility-maximizing movement of residents that proponents of
competitive federalism describe. Immigrants and citizens cannot simply
march to their jurisdictions of choice-whether they exist in sanctuary
states or restrictionist states-without exporting costs to a shared

308. KARST, supra note 59, at 193.

309. Id.; see also Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1395, 1397-98 (1997) (discussing the role the U.S. border plays in

defining membership); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1944-45 (1996) (discussing the self-definitional components

of immigration law).
310. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 296, at 151-52 (arguing that state enforcement is
consistent with existing definitions of the national community).
311. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY

MEMBERSHIP 74 (2006) (discussing different legal regimes governing the discriminatory treatment of
noncitizens).

312. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (striking down a state law that prevented
unauthorized immigrants from attending public schools); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
237-38 (1896) (extending due process rights to unauthorized immigrants).
313. See Pham, supra note 284, at 1121 (explaining why increased subnational enforcement
threatens to undermine these rights).
314. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (1994) (discussing popular attitudes toward illegal immigration).
315. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratoriesof Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553 (2o01) (arguing that welfare discrimination
against immigrants undermines the goal of national inclusiveness).
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national self-definition. It is true that much of this sorting already occurs
for reasons that have nothing to do with state immigration laws. For
example, the urban-suburban divisions in America reflect distinctive
racial and cultural communities that have formed in part out of
individual preferences."' There is nothing inherently wrong with
individuals moving to locations that match their cultural vision. Although
Americans tolerate certain privately formed homogenous groupings, the
same is not true for state-ushered movements. In fact, the nation
uniformly opposes state actions that group residents by race, religion, or
other impermissible factors."' It is this shared intolerance of state-based
sorting that forms the foundation of our national identity. Thus, despite
their many political differences, Americans believe in certain shared
values such as individualism, egalitarianism, and pluralism.' 5 The racial
and ideological groupings that result from immigration experiments
fundamentally weaken these values.
When subnational immigration regulations dilute national identity,
residents become partially estranged from the country.3"9 This intangible,
identity-based externality is extraordinarily difficult to measure. Yet
residents in both sanctuary states and restrictionist states may experience
some form of national disillusionment. For example, some Americans
may feel a sense of alienation because they live in a country where police
officers in other states harass immigrants or otherwise engage in selective
race-based enforcement. Conversely, other Americans may believe that
sanctuary policies undermine the rule of law in the United States,
thereby diluting a sense of shared national identity. Either way, states
that create these different types of disconnection do not internalize the
damage they cause to the national self-image. In this way, the identitybased harms of state immigration laws may be the least measurable, yet
most costly externality of today's experiments.
D.

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL REPLICATION

Proponents of local control explain how laboratory states provide
policy models for other jurisdictions to follow. They argue, for example,
that federal agents can observe and adopt the most effective enforcement
measures coming from states that experiment on immigration matters.3 2 o
316. Gulasekaram, supra note 83, at 1462-63 (discussing the role that wealth classifications and
individual preferences play in racial sorting).
317. Id. at 1487-88 ("The critical aspect of these distinctive enclaves is that they are
voluntary....").
318. KARST, supra note 19, at 31 (1989); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 823 (1992) (explaining how political and social actions create
communities).
319. See Pettys, supra note III, at 515-17 (discussing the contours of national membership).
320. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 13, at 843 (explaining how immigration experiments might
facilitate vertical learning).
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If restrictive jurisdictions suffer economic losses due to immigrant
departures, then other states will learn "quick lessons" and avoid such
outcomes.3 ' Conversely, if sanctuary laws improve relations with
immigrant communities, then outside jurisdictions might embrace this
tactic."'
Despite these optimistic forecasts, however, today's state
immigration laws offer few opportunities for true replication. Replication
requires a broad set of novel experiments operating in a number of
environments. Yet today's laboratory states have largely failed to
engage in this type of diverse experimentation. For example,
restrictionist states remain remarkably similar in their enforcement-only
focus. As explained above, some states have altered their penal codes to
create immigration-related crimes.324 Others require police officers to
verify the immigration status of detainees. Still others require employers
to serve as private immigration agents. These policies differ only in the
penalties they assess and the people they enlist to enforce them.
Sanctuary policies represent the opposite end of the same spectrum.
Many states and localities have taken a friendlier approach to
immigration experimentation by refusing to cooperate with federal
officials. For example, four states currently prohibit police from asking
suspects about their immigration status, and roughly fifty cities and
counties have enacted ordinances that limit local officers' involvement in
immigration matters.' These laws differ from their restrictionist
counterparts only in the level of cooperation they provide. But whether a
state requires police officers to verify a suspect's immigration status or
forbids them from doing so, each approach simply experiments with
different levels of immigration control. None of these policies involves
the kind of diverse, problem-solving methods needed for replication.
Forced federalism explains why laboratory states have failed to
innovate on immigration matters. Recall that forced federalism defines a
legally amorphous zone between clearly impermissible state immigration
actions (e.g., categorically excluding groups of immigrants) and clearly
321. Id. at 832-33 (discussing horizontal replication); Kadidal, supra note 227, at 503 ("[O]ther
states might follow the lead of liberalizing states.").
322. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
FederalImmigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1404 (2oo6) ("If successful, the laws would serve
as models for other local governments .... .").
323. See supra Parts II.A & II.B and accompanying discussions of the conditions needed for
effective experimentation.
324. See supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying discussion of current immigration experiments.
325. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW Cra., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTrrIrED ACROSS THE
U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORMES, 1-20 (2oo8); see

also Aoki et al., supra note 57, at 493-94 (explaining how localities have attempted to assert their
autonomy through sanctuary policies).
326. See Su, supra note 279, at 179 (observing that state and local immigration laws are "relatively
identical").
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allowable conduct (e.g., exercising police power). Because of the
narrowness of these parameters, states engaged in immigration
experimentation cannot do the creative work of true sovereigns, such as
admitting immigrants based on local labor needs or deferring removal
actions based on humanitarian concerns. Likewise, they cannot act as
true partners of the federal government under a system of cooperative
federalism in which they possess broad discretion to implement federally
defined immigration guidelines based on local expertise. Rather, states
operating within forced federalism are limited to deciding what level of
immigration control they will exercise. They can attempt to push the
upward boundaries of this system by exercising higher levels of control
(in the case of restrictionist states) or operate at the lower boundaries of
the system (in the case of sanctuary states) by refusing to assist federal
officials. But either way, they do not engage in the high-variance testing
necessary for true innovation.3 27 Without regulatory autonomy, states
cannot take the risks needed to produce diverse and replicable results.""
The limitations of forced federalism do not necessarily mean that
the alternatives of dual federalism or cooperative federalism would yield
better outcomes. Although states that act freely as sovereigns or creative
servants might be emboldened to take more diverse approaches to
immigration problems, their methods would generate negative
externalities as well. A system wherein fifty different jurisdictions issued
separate visas, for example, would certainly undermine national
uniformity on admissions decisions and could interfere with U.S. foreign
policy priorities.3 29 Further, a more cooperative model of enforcement
would create problems of its own. Data emerging from localities that
have signed agreements with ICE to enforce federal immigration laws
suggest that problems with racial profiling and inconsistent enforcement
continue.33 o Thus, enforcement systems based on other models of
federalism might yield better opportunities for replication, but these
approaches would produce serious spillover problems of their own.

327. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, iI8 YALE L.J. 480, 514-15 (208)
(discussing incentives for encouraging experiments with high-variance outcomes).
328. See Siegel, supra note 120, at 1648-50 (arguing that federal preemption limits states choice
and, therefore, inhibits experimentation); see also James A. Gardner, The "States-as-Laboratories"
Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 475, 484 (1996) (arguing that innovation
depends on state discretion).
329. See Manheim, supra note 46, at 985 (explaining how such a system might disrupt U.S.
relations with foreign countries); Pham, supra note 60, at 994-95 (same).
33o. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 69, at 23-24 (summarizing
allegations of racial profiling and acknowledging the need to evaluate the civil rights records of
cooperating local agencies); NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CrR., SECURE COMMUNmEs, supra note 69, at 4-5
(discussing allegations of racial profiling made against police engaged in cooperative enforcement); see
also Archibold,supra note 297, at A I (summarizing discrimination complaints involving state-federal
enforcement efforts).
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Today's immigration experiments certainly offer some opportunity
for replication. In fact, the more that two states share comparable
resources, demographics, and geographic characteristics, the more likely
it is that each state can learn from the other.33 ' Nevertheless, the lack of
diversity in current state immigration laws suggests that few jurisdictions
have actually enacted enforcement schemes that provide truly unique
avenues for other states to observe and replicate.
As for the prospect of vertical replication, today's state immigration
laws do very little to advance most of the pressing decisions that the
federal government faces on immigration matters. Congress's last serious
attempt to reform the nation's immigration system focused on three
issues: (i) granting amnesty to unauthorized immigrants; (2) expanding
the existing guestworker program; and (3) strengthening enforcement
capabilities.332 Unfortunately, current state experiments provide virtually
no information on any of these issues. This is true even for enhanced
enforcement. Although the federal government might gain some insight
from state attempts to verify their workforces based on Social Security
records, the information contained in this database is unreliable333 and,
much of the knowledge derived from these experiments will become
obsolete if the federal government implements a tamperproof
identification system-a key component of immigration reform
proposals.334 In addition, states that encourage police officers to arrest
unauthorized immigrants do not offer a realistic system of interior
enforcement given that the federal government lacks the resources to
detain even a small percentage of the existing unauthorized population.
In sum, state immigration laws fail to meet the two necessary
conditions of successful experiments: internalization and replication.
States that enact immigration regulations not only distort their own
regulatory incentives through externalization, they magnify the risk that
failed experiments pose to the nation. Further, because forced federalism
denies them regulatory autonomy, states cannot produce diverse testing
331. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 123, at 1347 (arguing that state policies that are tailored to
local needs offer fewer opportunities for replication).
332. See Wishnie, supra note 20, at 1446-47 (discussing the central components of immigration
reform); see also Kati L. Griffith, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of JRCA and
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 127-28 (2oo8) (arguing that recent proposals
for immigration reform fail to adequately address the rights of unauthorized immigrants).
333. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1996 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that Social Security records "are prone to error").
334. See Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of Workplace
Immigration Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 59, 6o, 61 n.ii (2oo6)
(summarizing federal immigration reform proposals that include provisions for tamperproof
identification cards).
335. See John S. Baker Jr., A Letter to Lou Dobbs: How to Reverse Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 373, 381 (2oo8) (explaining why the federal government lacks the resources to arrest and
deport most of the unauthorized population).
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models for other states and the federal government to replicate. In other
words, the states that Justice Brandeis described as models for enacting
"novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country" simply do not exist within forced federalism.336
CONCLUSION

Current support for state immigration laws rests on the intuitively
attractive proposition that local experimentation can help solve the
country's immigration problems. But state immigration laws actually
provide very little useful information to the rest of the country. Although
the current system of federal underenforcement generates spillover
problems, state-based immigration laws merely replace one system of
negative externalities with another.
Richard Stewart famously described "Madison's Nightmare" as the
fear that our federal government might become paralyzed by competing
minority interests and, therefore, unable to solve pressing national
problems.337 With reform efforts stalled at the national level once again,
our country appears to be drifting through a never-ending version of
Madison's Nightmare on immigration matters."' States have offered to
wake the country up from this dream by taking control of their own
borders. Unfortunately, not all subjects are ripe for local
experimentation and not all tests produce valid results. Despite the
appealing image of states as laboratories, today's immigration experiments
will not advance the nation's ongoing search for sounder immigration
policies.

336. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
337. See Hills, supra note 125, at to (citing Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. Cm. L.
REV. 335, 342 (1990)).
338. See Rodrfguez, supra note 53, at 617 & n.220 (discussing the difficulty of sustaining a national
conversation about immigration).

